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If elections are to be thought fair, their outcomes should correspond as closely as possible 
to the inputs of voter preferences. A particular percentage of the votes counted for a party 
should produce close to the same percentage of the seats won by that party. Down that 
path lie the topics of partisan bias and proportional representation with multi-member 
electoral districts as the most common solution. But there is a second criterion of fairness 
which is that outcomes should correspond to the numbers of electors or people to be 
represented. That criterion is often called equality, and down that path lie the topics of 
malapportionment and enforced equality as a solution. The two criteria may not work in 
the same direction.1 In Australia the problem of equality has been debated mainly with 
respect to the dichotomy of town and country, town usually meaning the State capital(s) 
which have been invariably by far the largest urban center in each State and country the 
rest, though sometimes the larger provincial cities and towns get lumped in with their 
local metropolis. Should town voters have the same quantity of representation, measured 
by the number of electors in the electoral districts, as country voters? 
 
There has also been a sub-plot, which is what this paper is about, that concerns the 
existence of a small number of electoral districts spread over exceptionally large areas in 
which the population, and consequently the numbers of electors, is relatively thin on the 
ground and widely scattered. These electoral districts are believed, with some 
justification, to experience special problems with securing effective representation in the 
political process. Australia has pioneered both machinery and procedures which are 
required to address those problems. Recently the increasing frequency with which that 
machinery and those procedures have been used to re-draw existing electoral boundaries 
may have stimulated controversy about the process and the acceptability of its outcomes. 
Most recently, in 2006 a redistribution of their House of Representatives electoral 
districts (known as divisions and used for federal and Tasmanian lower house elections) 
in two States produced considerable controversy, rather more in New South Wales where 
a division dating back to Federation had been abolished than in Queensland where a new 
division was created for the first time. The outstanding characteristic of both divisions 
was their large area and the wide scatter of their population centers.  
 
The paper will look at a century of federal boundary-drawing in those two States, New 
South Wales and Queensland, and try to provide a body of evidence to inform criticism 
and judgment and against which the most recent outcomes might have been assessed. 
 
 
Drawing divisional boundaries: a short history 
The boundaries of electoral districts may be taken off the peg by using boundaries 
already created for some other purpose. Australias federal upper house, the Senate, has 
used the State boundaries which date from the colonial era for electing first 36, then 60 
and now 72 Senators, and post-federation Territorial boundaries for another four 
Senators. Fifteen other Australian legislative chambers are elected on boundaries 
specially drawn for the purpose. The remaining exceptions are all bicameral States, one 
                                                 
1 Colin Hughes, 1978, Fair and Equal Constituencies, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative 
Politics 16 (3): 256-71. 
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(Tasmania) where the House of Assembly boundaries are the same as those drawn for the 
federal lower house but the electoral districts are multi-member and election is by 
proportional representation, and two (New South Wales and South Australia) where there 
are no upper house boundaries and the members are elected at large for the whole State; 
like the Senate they use colonial State boundaries and proportional representation. There 
was a time in some States when there were a third level of boundaries. In such cases the 
State was divided into several zones, the zonal boundaries were prescribed by legislation 
and usually the redistribution commissioners could not draw electoral districts that 
crossed them. There is now only one instance of zoning and it affects the State upper 
house in Western Australia.   
 
Representative government was introduced to Australia early in the 19th century. 
Thereafter electoral district boundaries were drawn, ostensibly by the colonial legislature 
but actually by the colonial government of the day. Starting with New South Wales in 
1893 and following a recent development in New Zealand, responsibility for the process 
was passed to ad hoc commissions, recruited usually from the local judiciary and the 
local public service and subject to rules contained in local legislation. The change was 
well received and that arrangement spread gradually to the other five colony/state 
jurisdictions. Immediately after Federation in 1901 it was adopted for the House of 
Representatives, with a separate one-member commission appointed for each State. This 
paper ignores the States experience to concentrate on federal redistributions and as the 
two combined have generated only a modest literature2 some further explanation is 
necessary. In the United States, where the process is called redistricting, there is in 
sharp contrast a vast and often polemical literature although only 10 per cent of the 
population has heard a lot about the process.3  
 
As to the persons appointed to conduct federal redistributions, initially the provision of 
the Commonwealth Electoral Act (hereafter CEA) read merely that the single 
commissioner should be one person in each State (CEA 1902, s.13). When the 
commission was enlarged to three persons the provision became one shall be the Chief 
Electoral Officer or an officer having similar qualifications, and, if his services are 
obtainable, one shall be the Surveyor-General of the State or an officer having similar 
qualifications (CEA 1918, s.6(1)). The Chief Electoral Officer was the career public 
servant who headed the Electoral Office, a branch within a federal ministerial 
department, but with considerable independence recognised de facto. A section of the 
Electoral Office existed in each State, headed by a Commonwealth Electoral Officer 
(CEO) answerable to Canberra, and a tiny office, presided over by the Divisional 
Returning Officer (DRO), was set up in each division. The CEOs were later renamed 
Australian Electoral Officers (AEOs), and they and the Chief Electoral Officers were 
made statutory officers as a further guarantee of their independence.    
                                                 
2 E.g. Michael Maley, Trevor Morling and Robin Bell, 1996, Alternative ways of redistricting with single-
member seats: the case of Australia, in Iain McLean and David Butler (eds.), Fixing the Boundaries: 
Defining and Redefining Single-Member Electoral Districts, Aldershot, Dartmouth, pp.119-46.  
3 E.g. David Butler and Bruce Cain, 1992, Congressional Redistricting: Comparative and Theoretical 
Perspectives, New York, Macmillan; Pew Research Centre, 2006, Lack of Competition in Elections Fails 
to Stir Public released 27 October  (people-press.org). 
  4
 
Finally, in 1983, the Electoral Office became a statutory body, the Australian Electoral 
Commission (AEC), the Chief Electoral Officer became the Electoral Commissioner and 
was joined by two part-time Commissioners, the chairman of the Commission who must 
be a judge or a retired judge, and the non-judicial appointee who is required to be the 
head of a federal department or hold an equivalent post (CEA 1918, s.70(2)) and has 
invariably been the Commonwealth Statistician. At the same time, the process was 
divided into two stages.  Initially there are four members (called the redistribution 
committee). The Electoral Commissioner presides over all redistribution committees, 
and the other members are the AEO for that State, and two specified State officials, the 
Auditor-General and the Surveyor-General (CEA 1918, s.60(2)). During the later stage, 
on appeal so to speak, these four are joined by the two part-time members of the AEC 
(the body is called the augmented commission) and the judge presides.   
 
As to actual practice, in the beginning the Commonwealth Electoral Officer usually, but 
not invariably, drew the electoral boundaries for his own State. After three 
commissioners were required, he and the States Surveyor-General would be joined 
usually by the public service head of a federal department in the State, one that required 
close knowledge of that States geography. In 1975 the Labor government, which had 
extensive changes to electoral law in mind but was frustrated by a hostile Senate, used the 
statutory discretion over the third place to choose more widely: for the three states with 
the most numerous seats a retired State public servant and two academics who had 
written about electoral matters (including for Queensland the present writer) were 
appointed, but that was a rare departure from the norm and is no longer possible under 
the Act.    
 
When responsibility passed from politicians to neutral commissioners, statutory 
provisions set criteria to be applied but those provisions still left considerable discretion.  
Three criteria could best be thought of as qualitative: community of interest,4 means of 
communication and physical features. Others might be partly quantitative, like setting the 
permissible maximum deviation from a State zonal average (the quota) but without 
saying anything about location within the permitted range. When a State had created 
zones for its own elections, those zones would have their own, separate quotas. 
Sometimes a criterion might look qualitative but yet be capable of being rendered 
quantitative, like existing boundaries of divisions which could be quantified as the 
proportion of electors remaining in their original divisions but never was in the 
legislation. The permissible quota deviation criterion perforce outranked all others as 
commissioners frequently and ruefully have acknowledged. In the earliest reports, when 
argument was optional, individual commissioners sometimes referred  with apparent 
favoritism to a particular criterion e.g. in the New South Wales 1903 report there is a 
steady refrain of  well-defined natural features at the end of many divisional 
descriptions.   
 
                                                 
4 Australian Electoral Commission, 1985, Community of Interest (Research Report No.3 of 1985), 
Canberra, AGPS. 
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Among the earliest reports two displayed some originality, but neither was taken up 
subsequently as a model to be adopted by, or imposed on, all commissioners. In 1903 the 
South Australian report by W.R. Boothby,5 incidentally the only redistribution 
commissioner to have a division named after him, assembled occupational statistics for 
each division, presumably as a measure of community of interest.6 In 1906 the New 
South Wales report ranged more widely than that; it will be discussed below. But the 
statute, and this applies to the state legislation as well as the federal, never assigned 
weights to the criteria it listed, nor required each division to be approximately equal in 
merit in the application of the qualitative criteria - or in demerit for failure to apply them, 
or how far in proximity to or distance from the limits set by the quantitative criteria. Nor 
did it say whether Parliament thought it preferable to have one dogs breakfast of a 
division and the rest nearly perfect in compliance, or for each to have a similar number of 
defects. A hundred years on, redistribution commissioners are no better placed when 
working with the original criteria, though since 1983 there has been a significant addition 
to the quantitative criterion that seeks to average enrolment equality out over time instead 
of concentrating on the moment the redistribution began.   
 
On the other hand, improvements to the input of the process and protections for its 
independence from partisan considerations have gradually been added. So, on the input 
front, from 1968 onwards public input has been made public (initially published in a 
separate volume, then as microfiches and finally as CD-Roms) at the same time as the 
commissioners printed reports, though the commissioners deliberations have always 
been and remain confidential.7 The current, and most complex, version of the federal 
system begins with publicly accessible written input, is followed by publicly accessible 
written comment on that input, holds public hearings, produces a set of proposals, 
receives publicly accessible written comment on those proposals, confirms or amends 
those proposals and, if any changes are thought to be significantly different from the 
first proposed boundaries, may hold another round of public hearings.   
 
On the independence front two developments are significant. Originally there had been a 
very real possibility of a parliamentary veto. Prior to 1983 either chamber could fail to 
vote on proposals, or it could defeat a motion to adopt the proposals or vote to reject 
them, but there never was a power to amend the commissions proposals vested in the 
legislature. In 1983 the parliamentary veto was abolished, and now what the commission 
finally decides goes into effect forthwith. Second, also since 1983, initiation of the 
redistribution process has been taken out of the hands of the government of the day and is 
determined by constitutional and statutory provisions. However the possibility of minor 
tinkering with the system is always there, as when the Northern Territory was at risk of 
losing one of its two divisions, and the statutory formula for calculating the Territories 
entitlements to seats was slightly modified (CEA 1918, s.47) to make this less likely. 
                                                 
5 Geoffrey Hawker, 1969, Boothby, William Robinson &c, in Douglas Pike (ed.), Australian Dictionary 
of Biography, v.3, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, pp.196-97. 
6 Report by the Commissioner (Mr. W.R. Boothby) appointed to distribute the State of South Australia into 
Divisions, 1903, C.P.P., v.2, No.20. 
7 Colin Hughes and Don Aitkin, 1970, The Federal Redistribution of 1968: A case study in Australian 
political conflict, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 8 (1), pp.18-39. 
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There have also been several technological improvements. One of the greatest dangers, 
particularly for the States with the most divisions, is losing a parcel of electors from the 
on-going count whilst redistributing, or else counting them twice by putting a parcel into 
two divisions simultaneously. Such errors were likely to be discovered late in the day and 
prove difficult and time-consuming to locate and correct. Adding machines, first 
mechanical and then electric, helped somewhat with keeping track of total numbers but 
were not foolproof. Meanwhile the United States, with its multiplicity of electoral 
jurisdictions and decades of technological experiments in electoral administration, moved 
on and there were demands that Australia follow.  In 1983 for the first time a computer 
program was written to keep track all of the time of all of the electors in the state being 
redistributed; it also gave instant access to a running count for every division in that state.  
There was only sufficient time then to introduce it for the three largest states, but once its 
worth was proven attention moved on to the cartographic component of the process.   
 
The original boundaries for the first election in 1901 relied primarily on the existing State 
electoral districts in which the electors, now federal as well in their status, were located. 
Subsequently each federal division was broken down into sub-divisions for roll-keeping 
and election management purposes, and these became the building blocks for the 
redistribution process and appear by name in the redistribution reports. When necessary a 
sub-division could be split into two or more parts to go their separate ways, whereupon 
the local DRO and staff were required to do the necessary sums using their local 
knowledge. Votes were also collected and published by sub-division (and not by polling 
place until 1984) which made calculating partisan considerations easier and encouraged 
inertia when revising boundaries. Within sub-divisions, roll management came to rely on 
regular habitation reviews, house-to-house canvassing by temporary staff recruited for 
the purpose who established from occupants or neighbours whether persons listed on the 
roll still lived there and if there were persons qualified to be on the roll but not enrolled 
who could be required to do so. The canvassers were allocated walks by their local 
DROs, and these lists of addresses showing the electors resident at each address became 
the basic unit below the sub-division for such electoral problem-solving as might require 
the information.   
 
The habitation review process closely resembled that followed for the quinquennial 
national census  and indeed electoral officials assisted in census work. However, a 
different set of small geographical units, the census collectors districts (CCD), had been 
created for that purpose. Consequently the Commonwealths two most comprehensive 
lists of its citizens rested on quite different smallest-unit boundaries, an undesirable state 
of affairs for comparisons of data. As the CCDs were the more stable  the many uses to 
which census data are put required longer time series  electors were re-allocated to their 
CCD. This change, and the assistance of CSIRO mapping specialists, allowed the 
redistribution process after 1984 to be computer-driven with electoral maps on screen 
whilst boundaries were drawn and numbers of electors calculated. More options could be 
considered, and their consequences followed through the state, much more quickly and 
accurately. Thus, for example, at the 2006 NSW redistribution there were 11,857 CCDs 
available to be used as the smallest building blocks when fine-tuning was required, 
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although in practice it was the larger Statistical Local Areas (SLAs), made up of a 
number of CCDs, which appear in the reports and are the mainstay of the redistribution 
process. 
 
About the same time sub-divisions were effectively abolished for roll-keeping although 
they remain a ghostly presence in the CEA. The intention when they were first introduced 
had been that they should contain small numbers of electors who could be readily 
identified by local polling officials and party poll-watchers. At the 1910 election over a 
quarter of the national total of electors were located in sub-divisions that had fewer than 
2000 on the roll and over two-thirds were in those under 5000; only 4.4 per cent were in 
sub-divisions exceeding 10 000. But by 1983 the proportion in sub-divisions below 2000 
in enrolment was down to 1.4 per cent and in those below 5000 to 14.8 per cent whilst 
42.5 per cent were in sub-divisions over the 10 000 mark. Moreover, practice varied 
considerably among the States. Tasmania (13.2 per cent) and New South Wales (19.9 per 
cent) had the smallest proportions in sub-divisions with more than 10 000 electors, 
Victoria (42.0 per cent) and Queensland (53.3 per cent) were in between, Western 
Australia (77.4 per cent) and South Australia (87.3 per cent) the highest. Abandonment of 
sub-divisions in practice promptly became one of the complaints made by critics of the 
1983 changes on the ground that it opened the way to massive voting fraud.8 However the 
criticism incorrectly claimed that the sub-division system had required a voter to attend a 
particular polling booth close to home which it did not. That option is known as 
precinct voting and, whilst it is common overseas, it never had much appeal in Australia 
because of the mobility of the population on any one day. From the 1992 reports onwards 
the building blocks being moved in whole or in part have been the SLAs which, because 
they correspond to local government authority areas, are better known to the public. 
 
The Commonwealth Constitution (s.24) allocates House of Representatives seats to the 
constituent, still six in number, States according to their population, subject to a 
guarantee of a minimum of five members to each of the original States. Despite two 
enlargements of membership since 1901, prior to the 1949 and 1984 general elections, 
the provision still benefits one State, Tasmania, but to the extent of only one seat. 
Originally it benefited Western Australia as well. Unlike the United States, there was 
little relative movement among the constituent States during the 20th century. The 
percentages of House of Representatives seats for each State at the first general election 
in 1901, and the two enlargement elections in 1949 and 1984, and at the forthcoming 
2007 election vary little. New South Wales went down from a high of 38.8 per cent 
(1949) to 32.7 per cent (2007); Victoria down from 30.7 per cent (1901) to 24.7 per cent 
(2007); South Australia down from 9.3 per cent (1901) to 7.3 per cent (2007); Tasmania 
down from 6.7 per cent (1901) to 3.3 per cent (2007); Queensland went up from 12.0 per 
cent (1901) to19.3 per cent (2007); Western Australia up from 6.7% (1901) to 10.0% 
(2007); and the Territories recorded 2.0 per cent (1984) and 2.7 per cent (2007). Only one 
State (Western Australia) has moved in rank order and it went up only one place to 
overtake South Australia. Probably the most striking statistic that could be compiled is 
the relative decline in division numbers, and therefore potentially in political importance, 
                                                 
8 Brian Wilshire, 1992, The Fine Print: Australia’s Special Role in the New World Order, Round Corner, 
NSW, the Author, pp.50-52. 
  8
of the three south-eastern corner States combined (Victoria, South Australia and 
Tasmania) from 46.7 per cent (1901) to 35.3 per cent (2007). 
  
On the next question the Commonwealth Constitution is silent, but since the CEA 1902 
the allocation of electoral districts within each State has always depended on enrolment 
numbers. Using a continuous roll and with compulsory enrolment operating since 1911, 
this choice produces a very different situation from allocation of seats by population, for 
example when counted at a decennial census as in the United States, for the Australian 
statistics are as close to up to date as the daily flow of enrolment changes allows. 
Immediately after Federation the federal government set up its own enrolment machinery 
and began to compile its own rolls. Subsequently, over decades each of the States 
negotiated a joint roll agreement whereby primary roll-compiling activities were 
undertaken by the federal authority and roll information was supplied as required to the 
States equivalent bodies.   
 
Initially redistributions were likely to be conducted every five years after the census as 
was envisaged by the Representation Act 1905. However there was no obligation to do 
so, and both census and redistribution might be postponed if the government of the day 
thought that advisable. Since 1977, following a High Court decision9 and consequent 
legislation, it has been obligatory to check State population relativities for each 
successive House of Representatives before it is elected; that requires launching the 
process fairly soon after the previous election. If a State lost or gained a seat, there being 
a slight flexibility in the total membership number so that changes need not balance 
exactly, a redistribution of that State has to follow. When the two mainland Territories, 
the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern Territory, eventually secured 
full-voting-rights representation in the House of Representatives (allowed but not 
guaranteed by the Constitution), they were brought within the same numbers-allocating 
regime by legislation.   
 
Since 1983 holding a redistribution for a State or Territory has been obligatory, if (i) it 
has lost or gained a seat, (ii) seven years (a term intended to allow three general elections 
to be held on one set of boundaries unless either of the other triggers operates) have 
passed since its previous redistribution, or (iii) more than a third of its divisions have 
been malapportioned i.e. deviated from the average by more than 10 per cent for two 
successive months. To allow public scrutiny of the third possibility, each month current 
enrolments of all divisions were published in the Government Gazette though this has 
recently stopped.10 To date this trigger has never operated, and all post-1983 
redistributions have been started by one or other of the first two.11   
 
One consequence of the new regime was that the six States soon got out of step.   
Tasmania, with its constitutional guarantee of five seats, could never lose a seat but 
neither was it ever able to gain one. New South Wales, at the other end of the scale, lost 
                                                 
9 Attorney-General (ex rel. McKinlay) v Commonwealth (1977) 7 ALR 159. 
10 Peter Brent and Simon Jackman, 2007, A shrinking Australian electoral roll, Discussion Paper 11/07, 
Canberra, Democratic Audit of Australia, Australian National University. 
11 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, Part IV. 
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two seats over the period, but managed to time its losses to the end of a regular cycle. 
Thus those two States have not had premature redistributions. South Australia also lost 
two seats over the period, got though the first cycle satisfactorily but has since had two 
premature redistributions, in 1999 and 2003. Victoria, another State to have lost two 
seats, one in 1989 during the first cycle and the other in 1994 before its new, second 
cycle had finished, but has since made it through the third cycle. Western Australia, like 
Victoria, failed to make it through the first cycle, its second cycle was completed, but the 
third fell short again; its problem was growth and the gain of two additional seats.   
 
Queensland has deviated most from the pattern originally hoped for. Having survived the 
first cycle, the State subsequently experienced the addition of five more seats, one at a 
time. Since 1992 there has been only one federal election in Queensland which was 
fought on the same boundaries as applied at the previous election. Concentrating on the 
two States featured in this paper, since the 1984 enlargement redistribution relatively 
static New South Wales has been redistributed only three times (1992, 2000, 2006) but 
steadily growing Queensland has been through the mill five times (1992, 1994, 1997, 
2003 and 2006). The Electoral and Referendum Amendment Act, no.94, 1998, s.12 (now 
CEA 1918, s.63A) introduced a concept of projection time which gave the AEC power 
to set the half-way time in a shorter period if the Commission was of the opinion that a 
further redistribution will or may be required sooner than seven years, but to date 
experience with that modification has been too limited to pass judgment on its 
effectiveness. 
 
 
The 2006 redistributions and partisan advantage 
With that background information made available, the paper can now turn to the latest 
redistributions of two States, New South Wales and Queensland, which took place in 
2006 because the first State had lost a seat and the second had gained a seat. Although 
approximately half of all 150 federal divisions were involved in the two redistributions, 
New South Wales going from 50 to 49 and Queensland from 28 to 29, public criticism 
was very much concentrated on only two of the divisions that resulted. Each was 
especially large in area, including as they did substantial portions of the archetypical 
outback, and their initial and final versions were criticised for the over-large areas 
created and apparent disregard of the community of interest criterion.12   
 
Readers who come from a tradition of partisan manipulation of electoral boundary-
drawing should turn to the relevant Research Note13 compiled by the Statistics and 
Mapping section of the federal Parliamentary Library. It calculates how the votes 
recorded at the previous general election (2004) would transfer into the new boundaries 
                                                 
12 Scott Bennett, 2007, Save Country Seats: the NSW redistribution 2005-06, Research Brief no.8, 2006-
07, Canberra, Department of Parliamentary Services; see also Phillip Coorey, 2006, Electoral 
redistribution sets of a game of musical seats, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 September; editorial, 2006, The 
seats of the problem, Sydney Morning Herald, 15-16 September; Lachlan Heywood, 2007, Voters given 
scant regard, Courier-Mail, 3 February. 
13 Queensland and New South Wales proposed redistributions, 2006, 2006, Canberra, Department of 
Parliamentary Services. 
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and then divides them, on the basis of the distribution of preferences at that election 
between the two government-forming possibilities, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and 
the Coalition of the Liberal and National parties, thereby creating what is called the two-
party-preferred vote for the new divisions.  Given the requirement of compulsory voting 
and a complete set of numbered preferences for all candidates on each divisions ballot-
paper if a vote is to be valid at a federal election, an excellent measure of partisan 
advantage is available.   
 
Gwydir, the division in New South Wales that disappeared, had been solid (68.4 per cent) 
for the Coalition. Flynn, the division that appeared in Queensland, would have been less 
solid (56.8 per cent) and there was some uncertainty which Coalition partner might win 
it, but on an initial examination there is no partisan advantage to be seen from the loss or 
gain of a seat. But what about all the other divisions which would have been affected by 
changed boundaries? On the Research Notes figures only two divisions in New South 
Wales and none in Queensland would change hands simply as a result of the 2006 
redistributions. Of the two changes in New South Wales, Calare was a special case which 
might cancel out the other, Parramatta. Perhaps closer examination, especially of 
marginal seats, would reveal more? 
 
The importance of the marginal seats was emphasized more than 30 years ago by the 
present Prime Minister, then only recently arrived in the House of Representatives but  
according to the Labor MP who spoke next  already representing the Liberal Party at 
redistribution hearings, when debating the 1975 redistribution of New South Wales: 
 
So the pattern emerges in New South Wales, so far as the marginal seats are 
concerned, in which Labor marginal seats are to be significantly strengthened and 
Opposition marginal seats are, in many cases, to be significantly weakened.  
These are the seats that really count so far as holding power in Australia is 
concerned. The Labor Party knows that it is electoral history in the rural areas of 
Australia and that its last hope of hanging on to power is to hold the large urban 
areas of Australia, particularly in Sydney and Melbourne.  It is therefore no real 
coincidence that we find in the metropolitan area a pattern that so clearly favours 
the Labor Party.14 
 
The present writer has long believed that in electoral districts where the previous winning 
two-party-preferred vote lies between 52 per cent and 50 per cent, the outcomes at the 
next election will be virtually unpredictable because of the possible influence of random 
and unusual factors. Nevertheless, because of the attention they receive in media 
discussion, we might as well start with them, first those in New South Wales.  There were 
five such divisions after the 2004 election. Two held by the ALP (Banks, Richmond) 
were slightly improved by the 2006 redistribution, but not enough to take them out of the 
highly marginal category. The third, previously held by the ALP (Parramatta) with 50.8 
per cent, lost enough (1.7 percentage points) to move it into the Coalitions column. 
Moreover, in 2004 there had been special circumstances favoring the ALP which would 
not apply in 2007.   
                                                 
14 C.P.D., v.HofR 95 (22 May 1975), p.2727, 
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The two divisions notionally held by the Coalition are very different. Both are at the 
south-eastern end of the chain of transfers of electors, consequent on the abolition of an 
existing division, with which this paper will eventually be concerned and so are affected 
by exceptionally large numbers of electors being moved in or out. One (Calare) was in 
fact not held by a Coalition MP but by an Independent, and its two-party-preferred vote is 
an artificial construct produced by recounting the ballot-papers for their Labor and 
Liberal preferences only. Calare recorded the thinnest of Coalition majorities (50.6 per 
cent) in 2004 though in the real world the Independent had started with an absolute 
majority (50.2 per cent) of first preferences and that majority grew substantially (to 71.2 
per cent) on the final count where his opponent was the Liberal candidate. However after 
the 2006 redistribution the two-party-preferred Coalition vote in the new Calare had 
increased so substantially (by 8.9 percentage points) that the Independent incumbents 
future at the 2007 election was brought into doubt. Initially he indicated that he might 
stand for the Senate instead, but then ill health required his retirement from political life. 
The incident has implications for the choice of electoral systems that lie beyond the scope 
of this paper.15  The other Coalition-held division (Greenway) is a simpler story. An even 
larger increase (by 10.8 percentage points) in the Coalition two-party-preferred vote 
moved the division into the safe category with 60.8 per cent of the two-party-preferred 
vote. 
 
In addition to those five divisions, there were 18 (seven ALP, eleven Coalition) where the 
winners two-party-preferred vote lay between 52 per cent and 60 per cent in 2004 and so 
might be thought potentially marginal. In only one ALP-held division did a hostile swing 
exceed 2 percentage points, and there (Werriwa) the seat remained safe. In only two 
Coalition-held divisions did the hostile swing exceed 2 percentage points, and both are 
interesting. In Macquarie the swing (9.4 percentage points) was large enough to move a 
previously fairly safe seat into the ALP column, but that division was sandwiched 
between Calare and Greenway and so was part of the major upheaval following on the 
need to abolish one division to be discussed below. In Wentworth, the other division, the 
adverse swing (3.0 percentage points) was much less, but for some time Wentworth had 
been an isolated Liberal island surrounded by ALP territory and the sea, and thus 
vulnerable to any redistribution that required its enlargement. It now had an additional 
reason to be of interest, a new MP who was spoken of as a potential Prime Minister. On 
this occasion its final boundaries were modified very slightly from the original 
proposals.16 Overall then, the redistribution in New South Wales had minimal party 
political implications. Where there were any, they appeared to be connected with the 
decision to make one division (Gwydir) disappear, a matter to which we will return.    
 
Queensland may be disposed of more quickly. There was only one division won by less 
than 52 per cent and it was unaffected. There were 15 (six ALP, nine Coalition) between 
52 per cent and 60 per cent, and only one experienced a change greater than 2 percentage 
                                                 
15 Rodney Smith and John OMahony, 2006, The cartel parties model and electoral barriers, in Ian Marsh 
(ed.), Political Parties in Transition?, Sydney, Federation Press, pp.94-115. 
16 2006 Redistribution of New South Wales Into49 Electoral Divisions, Canberra, Australian Electoral 
Commission, p.12. 
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points, Hinkler where the Coalition gained (3.4 percentage points) and again it was a 
consequence of the appearance of a new division (Flynn). There is not much partisan 
advantage to be seen.   
 
 
Characterising redistributions 
We can turn now to what will be the main theme of this paper. The federal system of 
redistributing divisions over the century since it was invented has had a history of 
matching the harsh realities of Australian geography and demography with Australian 
popular values of fairness and equality. It is a task which has been especially difficult in 
areas where those realities press hardest. The record for each of the two States will be 
divided into three sections corresponding to the original size of the House of 
Representatives (1901-48) and its two subsequent enlargements (1949-83 and 1984-
present), and each redistribution dealt with separately whether or not it came into effect 
subsequently.  
   
There is little by way of precedent for the examination of such a series of redistributions. 
Looking first at individual redistributions, which begin as a set of proposals for that 
redistribution, listing every movement of electors from one division to another would 
swamp the story with detail, even though occasionally chains of relatively small transfers 
may be significant. Similarly, if the data were presented as a matrix of all possible 
exchanges at the redistribution, particularly for the New South Wales data when many 
divisions would have only a couple of neighbours in the area now of interest and could 
not engage in direct transfers with the majority of seats in the matrix. It would be better to 
work towards a few statistics extracted for this purpose from the reports, and these have 
been consolidated in tables in the Appendix.   
 
The first statistic must indicate the extent to which the boundary of the area containing 
the very big divisions has been affected. It goes to the question of how different the area 
which is the focus of discussion here is from the neighboring divisions (the names of 
which are italicized in the tables summarising particular redistributions), and measures 
the extent to which the redistribution respected the existing boundary of that area, or 
moved electors across that notional line into or out of the area. A percentage of the quota 
applying at that redistribution is the most suitable figure, as it is also for some other 
matters, because over the century under review absolute numbers have changed 
substantially. In 1903 the quota for New South Wales was 22 684 and the permissible 
minimum below it 18 148; in 2006 the equivalent figures were 87 931 and 79 138. The 
permissible 20 per cent variation from quota in 1903 had been cut to 10 per cent by 2006. 
For the other state, Queensland, in 1903 the quota was 24 678 and the permissible 
minimum 19 742; in 2006 the quota was 85 220 and the permissible minimum 76 698. 
Given it is the big divisions with which the paper is concerned, only the permissible 
minimum is relevant but had it addressed, say, outer suburban divisions the permissible 
maximum would have been required as well. A hundred years ago the electors were 
much fewer in number but, as should soon become apparent, the arguments about the 
divisions to which they were allocated have remained much the same. 
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The second statistic, which has been anticipated in very recent redistribution reports, is 
the proportion of electors remaining in the same division for each division in the area of 
interest. The third is how many and which divisions were unchanged, slightly changed 
or substantially changed, or abolished. For this purpose, a substantial change has been 
taken to occur when <75 per cent of electors remain in their original division. The label 
unchanged does not mean that the division is exactly as it was before. Usually new 
electors will have been added, and so the label is most often applied to divisions which 
were low on enrolment and have been added to. A fourth statistic identifies transfers 
either in or out of a division on a scale likely to affect its character. An arbitrary 25 per 
cent of the current quota has been adopted as the minimum for either sort of transfer to be 
significant and again it should be remembered that when one of the divisions involved 
in such a transaction lies outside the big divisions area its name will be italicised. 
Inevitably for a marginal seat a gain or loss much smaller than 25 per cent of quota can 
affect the result. Except for the quota and the permissible minimum which applied at that 
redistribution, figures are rounded to the nearest hundred and percentages to the first 
decimal place.   
 
Anyone wishing to follow the story with maps can turn to G. Rhodes, I. Duncan, C. 
Pennyfield and E. Syne, Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1988: Electoral 
Redistributions, the contribution of the AEC and the Australian Surveying and Land 
Information Group, Department of Administrative Services, to the Australian 
Bicentenary celebrations. However failed redistributions are not included there. Post-
1988 boundary changes, initially those proposed and subsequently those which were 
implemented, are recorded in outline in the AECs occasional publication, Electoral 
Newsfile, starting at Number 15 (August 1991). Detailed maps are contained in the 
commissioners reports starting with 1968, at which point the commissioners are re-
titled distribution commissioners, and this applies to the lapsed redistributions of 
1975. A comprehensive list of all redistributions of the States and Territories, identified 
up to 1983 as accepted or rejected or lapsed because of Parliaments role in the 
process, can be found in the latest Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of 
Australia. 
 
 
The malapportionment record 
There might be a reasonable expectation at this point that the paper could be in large part 
about malapportionment. There was certainly discussion about fairness during the 2006 
redistribution  so what about equality? How much weightage was traditionally, or 
recently, given to the divisions which were large in area? Was there much difference in 
practice between New South Wales and Queensland? Was malapportionment likely to 
vary over the life of a particular redistribution? A variety of measures of 
malapportionment for the House of Representatives as a whole 1901-84 have been 
published,17 but as they are not broken down by State they would be of little assistance 
here. 
                                                 
17 Colin  Hughes, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1965-74, 1977, Canberra, Australian 
National University Press, pp.129-35, and id., 1986, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 
1975-84,  Sydney, Australian National University Press, pp.225-26. 
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The rest of the paper looks at redistributions and their enrolment numbers at the point of 
time when the redistribution figures were finalised in a report by the commissioner(s) 
and, prior to 1984, given to the responsible minister to present to the Commonwealth 
Parliament. Whether that report was ever accepted and the numbers it sought to change 
were put into effect is a different matter and will be specified. The paper is intended to 
show how those charged with conducting a redistribution of a particular State dealt with 
what will hereafter be called its big divisions, and not at what happened when the 
successors to those numbers (for enrolments inevitably marched on as soon as the new 
boundaries were in place) became operational at a general election, most importantly at 
the next general election and the elections that followed. (If a by-election has to be held 
after a redistribution has been effected, the roll that would have applied with the 
superceded boundaries has to be constructed.) Big is a suitable label for those divisions 
most distant from the State capital, mainly characterized by grazing and mining but with 
some agriculture and, especially, the largest in area in their State. Rural or non-urban 
would not be as suitable for some of them contain substantial cities like Broken Hill, 
Dubbo, Albury, Wagga Wagga and Tamworth in New South Wales, and Rockhampton, 
Mackay, Townsville and Cairns in Queensland. It is area, coupled with distance from the 
main center of population and of public life, that matters, and that most sharply defines 
the two areas which are the focus of this paper. 
 
However, before getting around to them, this section of the paper will look at the 
enrolment numbers which applied at the 41 general elections for the House of 
Representatives 1901-2004. A simple statistic for that purpose is the ratio between the 
average enrolment of the big divisions and the average enrolment for the whole State, 
expressed as a percentage. It should be remembered that, because of the relatively small 
numbers of big divisions involved, the enrolment size, whether much bigger or smaller, 
of one division can distort the combined statistic that describes all four or nine 
(depending on which State is being examined, Queensland or New South Wales). 
 
That record shows that in the past there was almost always some degree of weightage for 
the big divisions. At only four elections did the bloc of big divisions in New South Wales 
have a higher average enrolment than the State as a whole; for Queensland the number is 
six.  All but one (NSW 1913) of these occurred after 1983. But the degree of difference 
has never been very large: at only two elections (NSW 1901, 1903) did the big divisions 
fall below 80 per cent of the statewide figure  with 78.1 per cent the lower of the two. 
From 1949 onwards the big divisions weightage within their respective States was 
reduced and after 1984 it could be negative. 
 
As for the possibility of malapportionment within the big divisions areas in the two 
States, it is obvious that those largest in area were relatively advantaged prior to 1984. 
The statistics that follow come from the redistributions final reports and any earlier 
exercises are disregarded, but include the lapsed and defeated redistributions before 1984. 
In New South Wales, the division of Darling invariably had one of the two smallest 
enrolments up to and including the 1968 redistribution, and Riverina was most frequently 
the other. Divisions in the eastern part of the area rarely made it in to the two-smallest-
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enrolments category whereas the division with the largest enrolment, with one exception 
was invariably in the eastern sector of the area. In Queensland the pattern was even more 
pronounced. With three exceptions, the two smallest enrolments were in Kennedy and 
Maranoa (provisionally labeled Flynn in 1975), and with four exceptions the largest 
enrolment was Herberts. Whether or not those outcomes indicate a growing convention 
to look after the largest among the big divisions that was thought binding by the 
redistribution commissioners, they certainly contributed to a folk-memory along that line 
amongst rural politicians. 
 
The second enlargement of the House, coincident with the 1983 redistribution, marked a 
clear diminution of big division weightage. In the subsequent eight elections, only one 
falls below 95 per cent for New South Wales and none do so for Queensland, whilst as 
already indicated three NSW elections and six Queensland elections are above the 100 
per cent line. The explanation for this phenomenon is simple. In 1983 a further 
quantitative requirement had been added to the CEA which required the commissioners 
to as far as practicable, endeavour to ensure that, 3 years and 6 months after the making 
of the determination, the number of electors enrolled in each Electoral Division  will 
be equal.18 That formula has evolved to todays more complex would not, at the 
projection time determined under section 63A, be less than 96.5% or more than 103.5% 
of the average divisional enrolment (s.66).   
 
The intention was to introduce a form of handicapping to the system: those divisions 
which would grow slowly or even decline in enrolment would start with larger 
enrolments, those which would grow rapidly started with smaller enrolments. Spread 
over three elections all divisions in a state should average out about the same, and so their 
electors would have roughly equal electoral power in that longer run. The addition ruled 
out any attempt to advantage the majority of rural divisions, which on past form would 
grow slowly if at all, by ensuring that their enrolments would be set at quota, below it, or 
well below it. Those on the coast which were likely to grow steadily, even rapidly, would 
be started back in the field and move up. The original formula of be equal was, of 
course, unattainable if strictly applied, and it was necessary to guess how much deviation 
a judge might accept as inevitable if judicial review of proposals was sought. A figure of 
plus or minus 2 per cent was selected and applied, and after the event inserted in the 
CEA. That figure was subsequently raised to 3.5 per cent, and eventually was subject to 
an ad hoc inquiry by the JSCEM.19   
 
Because the big divisions were more likely to decline in enrolment, relatively, at a 
redistribution they would be put above quota, sometimes well above, and might still be 
there at the first election after the redistribution. At the next election their enrolments 
would decline towards the statewide average and at the third, and final in the life of that 
redistribution be below that average. Thus, over the eight elections since the change, the 
big divisions of New South Wales recorded 100.5, 99.5 and 95.9 per cent of their States 
                                                 
18 Commonwealth Electoral Legislation Amendment Act, no.144, 1983, s.25Z9(4)(a).  
19 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Report on the Effectiveness and Appropriateness of the 
Redistribution Provisions of Parts III and IV of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, 1995,Canberra, 
AGPS.  
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average during the life of the 1983 redistribution, then went back up to 107 per cent after 
the 1992 redistribution, and down again 98.2 and 94.8, most recently up to 100.8 after the 
2001 redistribution and down again to 99.7 per cent. In contrast Queensland successfully 
completed only one full three-election cycle, with big division figures of 102.7, 101.2 and 
98.3 per cent, after which successive changes in the States number of seats and 
consequent redistributions in 1994, 1997 and 2003 ensured it kept conducting the first 
election at which the new formula would put the big divisions above quota, after which 
acquisition of an additional seat sent the State back to the start of the cycle again. The 
question whether anything can be done about the Queensland phenomenon will be raised 
at the end of the paper. 
 
 
New South Wales 1901-48 
In the absence of Commonwealth legislation under which the job could be done, four of 
the six colonies, about to become States, had their initial House of Representatives 
electoral boundaries drawn for them by their colonial, subsequently State, parliaments.  
In the case of New South Wales the process created nine divisions (out of 26 for the 
whole State). For the time being, they might have been labeled inland because they did 
not reach the coast or were not within, or substantially overlapping, the Sydney and 
Newcastle urban areas. This paper focuses on the nine divisions, although two 
neighbouring divisions, Robertson and Werriwa, frequently return to play small parts 
with swaps across the notional area boundary. Table 1 identifies the original nine and the 
new divisions introduced subsequently, that existed at the beginning of each of the three 
periods defined by House of Representatives membership size.  The exclusion of coastal 
divisions removes the division of Eden-Monaro which might otherwise have appeared to 
be of interest, but as will appear below its involvement with the divisions that are 
included was relatively limited and its economic fortunes and enrolment numbers 
followed a different path. 
 
Te 1903 redistribution 
 
In 1901 three divisions, Barrier, Darling and Gwydir, bordered on Queensland; two, 
Barrier and Riverina, bordered on South Australia; and two, Riverina and Hume, 
bordered on Victoria. Drawing the boundaries of those five divisions was constrained to 
that extent; s.29 of the Commonwealth Constitution says House of Representatives 
divisions may not cross state boundaries. The 1906 commissioner wrote: 
 
[I]n considering these [extra-Metropolitan] Divisions as a whole, it is necessary to 
begin from the outside, and, with the whole of them constantly kept in sight, to 
work inwards, the outside boundaries of the State being immovable lines.20 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Report by the Commissioner (Judge Murray) appointed for the purpose of Distributing the State of New 
South Wales into Electoral Divisions, 1906, C.P.P., v.2, No.7, p.33.  
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Table 1 
   NSW divisions 
             1901 1949   1984    
Barrier   √     -       - 
Bland   √     -       - 
Canobolas/Calare √     √      √ 
Darling  √     √      √ 
Gwydir  √     √      √ 
Hume   √     √      √ 
Macquarie  √     √      √ 
New England  √     √      √ 
Riverina  √     √      √ 
Farrer   -     √      √ 
Lawson  -     √      - 
Parkes   -     -      √ 
 
The other four divisions did not reach an inter-state boundary, New England (which 
missed it narrowly), Canobolas, Macquarie and Bland. When boundaries had to be 
redrawn those divisions could expand or contract in any direction, and as we will see it is 
also possible to start in the middle of the area and then move around the periphery, 
clockwise or anti-clockwise.   
 
Under the State legislation, its Federal Elections Act 1900, the NSW legislature had not 
been bound by any restrictions on permissible deviation from the States quota when 
drawing the first boundaries. The three westernmost of what were to be the big divisions, 
Barrier (22.9 per cent below quota), Darling (25.3 per cent below), and Riverina (23.2 per 
cent below), came into existence already exceeding what would become in 1902 the 
permissible 20 per cent deviation below quota. Only one big division, New England, was 
over quota and that by only five percentage points. 
 
In 1903 Commonwealth legislation had been passed and electoral officials appointed, and 
the first federal redistribution could begin. With the Federation Drought as his 
backdrop, a single commissioner, William Houston, was put to redrawing the NSW 
boundaries.  The new CEA 1902 had imposed several important rules. The commissioner 
had to place his proposals before the Parliament where either chamber could reject (or 
fail to pass) them and tell him to try again. A set of qualitative criteria had to be given 
consideration in the process, and there was a criterion which was binding, the 20 per cent 
permissible deviation.   The quota was 22 680 and the permissible minimum 18 148. The 
number of electors (which he called their quantity of electoral power) in the State had 
just been more or less doubled by the enfranchisement of women, but the big divisions 
contained more males than females and so benefited less, and the intense drought had 
driven out many electors who had settled in the good years. Houstons report21 does not 
follow what was to be the regular practice of redistribution commissioners from the 1912 
redistribution onwards, providing convenient information for each proposed division of 
                                                 
21  Report of the Commissioner (Mr. William Houston) appointed to distribute the State of New South 
Wales into Divisions, 1903, C.P.P., v.2, No.42. 
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its electors coming in and where they came from, and its electors going out and where 
they went. The federal roll was very new, whereas the role the old State electoral districts 
had played in the construction of divisions for the 1901 election was still obvious and he 
often spoke of them. On the other hand, the 1903 report did contain detailed explanation 
and argument for his proposals, a desirable practice that would soon atrophy. It warrants 
generous reporting, as the first of its line and because of its similarities with the most 
recent report in 2006. 
 
 Houston declared his statewide assumptions: when more favorable seasons returned, the 
country population would grow, and in any event suburbs would expand and the inner 
city population contract. However, the limitations of the quota had prevented giving as 
full effect as was desired to the qualitative criteria. Although the number of divisions 
allocated to New South Wales remained unchanged, the nine big divisions were collapsed 
into eight. One, Barrier, would disappear and the commissioner explained why in 
language very like the arguments abroad in 2006: 
 
25.  As the revision approached the western limit of the State, the complications 
incident to the recession of population, and the small ratio of increase of electoral 
power, as compared with the high ratio in the eastern division, became more 
manifest. 
26.  In addition to this, examination disclosed isolated centres or knots of voting 
power, more or less remote from each other, and scattered over immense tracts of 
country, at the best of times never more than sparsely populated but, at the 
present, practically depopulated. 
27.  The extraordinary condition of thing[s] in the western division, and the slight 
accretions of electoral power in that division, as compared with other parts of the 
State, conjoined with the operation of the quota, produced a situation of  almost 
insuperable difficulty in regard to electoral division.22 
 
The westernmost part of New South Wales then comprised three divisions: Barrier with 
15 200 electors, Darling with 12 100 and Riverina with 14 900, a total of 42 200. The 
commissioner boiled them down to two, Darling with 18 400 and Riverina with 18 900, a 
total of 37 200, and shipped the leftover 5000 away in small (and explained) packets to 
the four divisions that lay to their east. The proposed Darling and Riverina were the last 
two divisions discussed in his report, and they had a lengthy defence: 
 
Many of the difficulties experienced up to the present stage have been due chiefly 
to the necessity for an adjustment of boundaries to provide for the relief of a 
congestion of electoral power within thickly-populated areas of comparatively 
small extent.  The situation now to be faced rests, for the most part, on conditions 
absolutely the converse of the above, as, dispersed over an area of nearly one-half 
of the State, there can be found only 37,248 adult electors.23 
 
                                                 
22  Ibid., p.6. 
23  Ibid., p.11. 
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That meant only two divisions could be formed, but there was a further problem in that 
two-thirds of that number were to be found in a few widely-separated centres. Broken 
Hill contained 12 000 electors, half a quota, after which there was a considerable drop 
down to the seven centres between 1000 and 2000 and another six with fewer than 1000. 
 
Looking at the pursuits and interests of the people in this part of the State, and 
especially the sporadic distribution of the voting power, it seems impossible to 
avoid the inclusion, in one or other of the two new divisions, of unsympathetic 
elements.  The design which has been adopted, though far from symmetrical, 
provides, as far as practicable, that common interests are preserved in each 
division.  The only departure from this principle exists in the southern division 
[Riverina]  24 
 
Unfortunately the paucity of numbers relating to transfers in this report rules out the 
calculations that can be derived from subsequent reports.   
 
In the event the 1903 report was not implemented and special legislation was passed to 
preserve the original divisions for one more election. On 14 August 1903 William Lyne 
(who had given up ministerial responsibility for electoral matters three days earlier) 
moved That this House disapprove of the proposed distribution of the State of New 
South Wales on the ground that the drought had depopulated certain areas: 
 
Though I have the fullest confidence in the Commissioner, I venture to affirm that 
if any honourable member will study the electoral map submitted, and will 
carefully note where a country electorate has been taken away, he will find that 
the legislative provision relating to community of interests has not been respected, 
and that the condition obtaining in one part of a district are entirely different from 
those which prevail in another part.  In this connexion I might instance the 
inclusion of the lower Riverina country, whose interests are both pastoral and 
agricultural, with towns like Cobar and White Cliffs, where, it is true, there is 
light pastoral country, but where the bulk of the people are miners.25 
 
Lyne added that a candidate in that division would have to pass through both Victoria and 
Sydney to visit all its parts, depending as he would have to on the existing railway 
system.  
 
His motion was amended to add in order that a fresh distribution be proposed by the 
Commissioner of the State, and the amended version passed 31-15, Protectionists and 
Labor defeating Free Traders.26 The brief debate on the rejection motion also raised 
questions about the suitability of George Lewis, the new Chief Electoral Officer, for that 
office and his previous career in the States Department of Lands, and about the condition 
of the rolls (in effect, whether all those electors had really left the area or might the rolls 
be defective). In Lewis favor he had been closely involved with introducing the NSW 
                                                 
24  Ibid., p.12. 
25 C.P.D., v.15 (14 August 1903), pp.3643, 3646. 
26 Ibid., p.3669; (31 August 1903), p.3785. 
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innovative model of redistribution machinery and one of the three who undertook the 
original 1900 federal distribution. It was asked whether three commissioners might not 
do a better job than one had just done.27 
 
 
The 1906 redistribution 
In 1906 Judge C.E.R. Murray, a frequent royal commissioner,28 was appointed to try 
again with New South Wales having been awarded an additional seat. By then the 
westernmost trio, Barrier, Darling and Riverina, had grown to 50 000 electors in total, but 
with the quota at 24 936 each of the three was still on or below the permissible minimum 
of 19 949, and again there was need to abolish what was being called an extra-
Metropolitan division. In his report29 the commissioner came at last to the western end 
of the State. 
 
It is at this stage necessary to consider how the great western country can be 
disposed of, with its very small and scattered population, though with a 
concentrated mass at Broken Hill; hemmed in, as it is, by Queensland, South 
Australia, and Victoria.  Where population is so sparse, and yet must be counted, 
for the purposes of distribution, by scores of thousands, the position of limiting 
boundaries, even though by great distances apart, is a very important element.30 
 
Murrays solution to the problem was very different from Houstons (see Appendix: 
Table 2). Barrier, starting with 20 000 electors, was slightly topped up from the western 
end of Riverina, so that it now ran the whole length of the border with South Australia.  
Darling, with only 14 200 needed more assistance and was topped up with a significant 
from the western end of Robertson, a division outside the area, and smaller numbers from 
Canobolas and Gwydir. Instead of using only the three most troublesome divisions to 
resolve his difficulties, Murray chose to dismember a division further east, Bland, which 
with only 19 800 electors was just below the permitted minimum. Bland provided 
significant transfers to Riverina which had started with only 16 000, thereby disposing of 
the remaining hard case among the westernmost three, and to Canobolas, and the rest of 
its electors were divided between Hume and Werriwa. The process of dismembering 
western divisions to comply with statewide requirements had begun, exactly a hundred 
years before 2006. Canobolas, now pushed beyond the quota maximum, passed most of 
its newfound surplus on to Macquarie, and because it had been so drastically altered by 
the exchanges was renamed Calare. 
 
This solution had been found within the area of the nine divisions, with a net transfer in 
that equaled only 1.6 per cent of the areas starting enrolment, and one still dependent on 
putting the three westernmost divisions near the bottom of the permitted range. Murray 
                                                 
27 Ibid., pp.3781-84; Janet Howse, 1986, Lewis, George,' in Bede Nairn and Geoffrey Serle (eds.),  
Australian Dictionary of Biography v.10, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, pp.92-93. 
28 Eds. H.J. Gibbney and Ann Smith, n.d.,  A Biographical Register 1788-1939, v.2, Canberra, Australian 
Dictionary of Biography, Australian National University,  p.130. 
29 Report by the Commissioner (Judge Murray)… New South Wales. 
30 Ibid., p.35. 
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formulated a doctrine to justify this course, expressed in language more judicial than 
Houstons. 
 
Unless there is something to indicate the improbability of substantial increase in 
thinly-settled country, or the likelihood of a comparative congested population 
becoming denser in a ratio above the average, it may be taken as a guiding rule, 
within fairly moderate limits, that an extension above the quota (or the average) is 
justifiable in a thickly-peopled, and a reduction is appropriate in a sparsely-
occupied, Division; but violent irregularities must be avoided.  It now becomes 
quite clear that the end of this redistribution, necessarily leaving the margins of 
the State to retain the individuality of their Divisions, must be a merger of 
Divisions about the centre.31 
 
Perhaps, though this can only be speculation, the possibility of such little ventures into 
quasi-judicial activism encouraged the subsequent abandonment of explanations for 
decisions.   
 
With the first two redistributions having been initiated at three year intervals (1903, 
1906), and thereby coinciding with a single maximum term of the House of 
Representatives, it was understandable that drawing boundaries that could last would be 
thought desirable, but how might this be achieved in practice? In Victoria the 
commissioner had thought the limits of the permitted range should be avoided lest they 
be breached too soon: 
 
This provision [the 20 per cent variation], I think, makes it obligatory on the 
Commissioner to leave in each proposed division a sufficient margin below the 
maximum number of electors, and above the minimum, to prevent any probable 
movement of population within a few years, bringing about the condition 
mentioned in the provision, since frequent changes of the boundaries of 
electorates are inconvenient, and to be avoided as far as practicable.32 
 
But in Western Australia the commissioner preferred putting them all near the quota: 
 
 I have endeavoured to maintain as close an agreement with the quota as was 
consistent with such [qualitative criteria] considerations, in the first place that 
appeared to be the intention of the Act, and, in the second, because such a course 
would, in all probability, obviate the necessity for a further redistribution in the 
near future, it being evident that the more extensive use is made of the margin of 
allowance the greater is the likelihood that fluctuations in population will, at no 
distant date, cause that margin to be exceeded.33  
                                                 
31 Ibid., pp.33, 36. 
32 Report by the Commissioner (Mr. C.A. Topp) appointed for the purpose of distributing the State of 
Victoria into Electoral Divisions, 1906, C.P.P., v.2, No.8, p.4. 
33 Report by the Commissioner (Mr. M.A.C. Fraser) appointed for the purpose of distributing the State of 
Western Australia into Electoral Divisions, 1906, C.P.P., v.2, No.10, p.5.  
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So long as each State was dealt with as a separate exercise by a different person, minor 
variations in approach were likely. If nothing was said by way of explanation, these 
would be less obvious. The 1906 proposals were duly accepted. 
 
 
The three 1912 redistributions 
In 1912 the CEA had been amended to adopt the original NSW state model and hereafter 
three commissioners were appointed. In New South Wales the States Surveyor-General, 
F. Poate, was chairman.34 There had been no change in the States number of seats but 
statewide enrolment had increased by 39 per cent, the quota was up to 34 657 and the 
permissible minimum grown to 27 726. In the western part of the State solutions were 
relatively non-threatening and certainly easier to produce, and the process was further 
assisted by a significant net transfer of electors into the area. Whilst a few transactions 
were substantial, none reached our measure of significant, and only two divisions would 
be substantially altered. Calare would lose 11 500 and gain 9700, and Macquarie with 
5100 out and 12 700 in. The report was dated 15 October 1912 and on 29 October some 
very minor corrections were communicated to the responsible minister, which had the 
unfortunate effect of suggesting excessive haste in the main report (see Appendix: Table 
3). It was at this point that commissioners generally stopped recording explanations for 
what they proposed. 
 
The responsible minister, King OMalley, moved approval of the NSW proposals in the 
House of Representatives on 31 October where the motion passed 25-24. The Opposition 
had asked for another distribution on the ground of disregard of community of interest in 
the proposals, and referred to the fact that a State redistribution was also under way. 
Tasmania, it was said, provided a good model where Commonwealth and State 
boundaries were made to coincide, and it was also pointed out that the 1910 Labor 
Conference voting 70-51 had supported a policy for two State districts to be within one 
federal district. The debate is of interest for the speeches of Bruce Smith on general 
principles, and of the Labor members for Barrier and Riverina about their own divisions 
which sound remarkably like what has been said by their successors for that part of the 
state at regular intervals ever since.35 But when George Pearce, the minister representing 
OMalley in the Senate, sought approval on 8 November the motion was defeated 12-14.   
 
In their second attempt36 the numbers to be moved became larger and the resulting 
changes more substantial and provided the one instance when as many as two of the 
areas divisions were to be abolished (see Appendix: Table 4). Macquarie and Riverina 
were each carved into three portions, and like Bland before them would vanish from the 
electoral map. Darling, the third westernmost division, would be topped up from Calare. 
Gwydir, instead of being left pretty much alone as in the first version, would retain less 
than half its current enrolment and, after being topped up from New England and 
                                                 
34 Report by the Commissioners appointed for the purpose of distributing the State of New South Wales into 
Electoral Divisions, 1912, C.P.P., v.2, No.48. 
35 C.P.D. v.47 (31 October 1912), pp.4921, 4925-27, 4930-34. 
36 Corrections in the Report by the Commissioners appointed for the purpose of distributing the State of 
New South Wales into Electoral Divisions, 1912, C.P.P., v.2., No.49.   
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Robertson, be renamed Namoi. The second report was also rejected, this time in the 
House of Representatives, 26-32 and by a non-partisan vote  Smith did not vote, 
Thomas (Barrier) was for it and Chanter (Riverina) against. A third attempt was then 
directed.37 That report38 reverted to the first reports proposals, was accepted without 
debate,39 and implemented as the 1913 redistribution (see Appendix: Table 3 again). The 
first and second reports nicely illustrate the minimalist and maximalist modes of 
redistributing: the first with one division substantially changed and no substantial 
transfers, the second with three substantially changed divisions  one so substantial its 
name has to be changed  and one division disappearing and six substantial transfers. The 
explanation is to be found in the first line of the tables in the Appendix. In the first 
exercise the big divisions area as a whole gained half a quota, in the second it lost three-
quarters of a quota. 
 
 
The 1922 redistribution 
By 1921 long-term demographic changes were again at work and New South Wales had 
gained a seat, up to 28. The quota was 39 478 and the permissible minimum 31 583. 
However two of the three westernmost divisions had lost enrolment absolutely since the 
1912 redistribution: Barrier and Darling were substantially down and adjacent Gwydir 
was down as well, but the third of the westernmost divisions, Riverina, had grown a 
trifle. The mining and pastoral industries were still shedding employment, but irrigation 
was starting to counter the general trend of rural depopulation. Gwydir was becoming 
more like Barrier and Darling, Riverina less like them.   
 
More significant though for the number of divisions which had to be put in play was the 
growth of the gap between the enrolment averages of what were being called  the 
metropolitan divisions and the non-metropolitan divisions  and would continue to be 
so characterised until the 1960s when the second category was subdivided between 
substantially urban and substantially rural.  The last category later became extra-
metropolitan. The gap, which had been less than 5000 electors in 1912, was now greater 
than 14 000. Clearly one or more big divisions would risk dismemberment to 
accommodate growth in the rest of the State outside the area.   
 
The commissioners reverted40 to the second-1912 reports strategy but with only one 
division going, and now there was a modest the extension of the area (see Appendix: 
Table 5). Barrier should be divided between Darling and Riverina, and disappear. 
Riverina should make small adjustments with Darling, Calare and Hume and still be 
slightly ahead at the end of the swaps. Gwydir was also in deficit to begin with, but not as 
far down as Barrier and Darling and after receipt of a net 10 800 from Darling had an 
increased in enrolment at the end. 
                                                 
37 C.P.D., v.49 (15 December 1912), p.7505. 
38 Further Report (No.3) by the Three Commissioners appointed for the purpose of re-distributing the State 
of New South Wales into Electoral Divisions, 1912, C.P.P., v.2, No.70. 
39 C.P.D., v.49 (20 December 1912), p.7570. 
40 Report by the Commissioners appointed for the purpose of redistributing the State of New South Wales 
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The 1931 redistribution 
In 1930 redistributions were started in four States, the three largest in population and 
Western Australia. The usual practice would have been to wait for the census due in June 
1931, but as that had been postponed as an economy measure in the growing crisis, it had 
been decided to start earlier.41 Unusually Stewart Irwin, who had served in 1922 as the 
CEO for New South Wales, was the Electoral Office member of the commission although 
now he was Chief Electoral Officer for the whole country.42 The selection may have been 
intended to utilise his knowledge from the previous event.  
 
There were still 28 divisions to be defined. The quota of 51 776 and the permissible 
minimum of 41 421 were now more than twice the equivalent figures for the first 
redistribution conducted in 1903. The gap of 3000 between metropolitan and non-
metropolitan averages that had been left by the 1921 redistribution had blown out to 
9000 by 1930, and the Commissioners sought to compress the gap to 4500 (see 
Appendix: Table 6). Their proposals submitted in 1931 were not approved, despite 
regular inquiries in Parliament as to how the matter was progressing, and so attention can 
be concentrated on what were now the three worst-cases, the two divisions previously in 
that category, Darling and Riverina once Barrier was gone, joined now by Gwydir. 
 
In the 1931 proposals Riverina was to be left alone, apart from two minor additions 
totaling 300 electors. Darling would lose about 4000, equally divided between Calare and 
Gwydir, and from Gwydir gain over 10 000. Gwydir, because of those changes plus 
another 1400 going to Calare, would be compensated by 15 600 coming 2000 from 
Darling, 5000 from New England, and 8500 from Robertson. The sole significant 
transfer restored a numerically viable Macquarie with electors from Robertson which 
was being abolished in order to create a new suburban division. The new Macquarie 
would have extended from Gosford and Wyong to Bathurst, after which its inclusioin in 
the big divisions area would have been problematical.   
 
Exceptionally, the 1931 commissioners quoted a bit of input to their deliberations, a 
protest from the leader of the federal Country Party, Dr Earle Page, primarily about his 
own coastal division of Cowper but with wider implications: 
 
That the proposed redistribution of Federal Electorates imposes unfair conditions 
upon the Electorate of Cowper and upon the Electors and Representatives of 
Country Electorates throughout the Commonwealth by reason of the failure of the 
Commissioners to use the power of discrimination granted under the Act in fixing 
the quotas for Country Electorates as near as possible to 40,000 and the quota of 
City Electorates as near as possible to 60,000.43 
 
                                                 
41 C.P.D., v.126 (31 July 1930), p.5076. 
42 Report by the Commissioners appointed for the purpose of redistributing the State of New South Wales 
into Electoral Divisions, 1931, C.P.P., v.3, No.159. 
43 Ibid., p.5. 
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The commissioners responded in their report that they had applied the Act. 
 
 
The 1934 redistribution 
There was a change of government in 1932, and the redistribution machinery was started 
up again in 1933 with the same number of divisions to work with. The quota was 53 115 
and the permissible minimum 42 412. In the meantime the gap between metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan averages had fallen to 7500, which may be evidence of the flight 
from the cities during the Great Depression. An unusually large addition to the area was 
made.44 Riverina was again barely touched, and Darling gained a net 8600 from Gwydir 
which would be the most substantially impacted of the largest three, losing on its western 
boundary, mainly to Darling, and gaining on its eastern boundary from Robertson and 
New England (see Appendix: Table 7). Robertson, which was not abolished this time, 
restored New England with the redistributions one significant transfer and 
consequently had to move to Sydneys northern edge where it has stayed. 
 
The proposals for New South Wales were accepted by Parliament, but Victoria had to be 
done again and Western Australia was done again twice and not finalized until 1937. By 
the last election (1946) held on the 1934 boundaries, five of the seven western divisions 
in New South Wales were slightly under the 20 per cent below average divisional 
enrolment, New England was just above the cut-off and Macquarie substantially above 
the cut-off but still below the average enrolment. Had there been a redistribution 
conducted at that time, only minor adjustments would have been needed, but instead the 
size of the House was increased from 75 to 120. 
 
 
New South Wales 1948-83 
 
The 1948 redistribution 
Between 1934 and 1948 enrolment in New South Wales grew from 1.4 million to 1.9 
million, but as the number of divisions allocated to the State was increased in 1948 from 
28 to 47 the redistribution quota fell.  It was not until 1962 that the quota and permissible 
range figures got back to twice what they had been in 1903 once more  which is where 
they had been before the enlargement in 1948. The substantial reduction in the quota 
removed the usual pressure to abolish a division somewhere in the western part of the 
State and lowered the minimum number of electors required to constitute a division to   
32 013.45 The starting problem of all the previous redistributions was reversed. Two 
additional divisions could be created in the big divisions area, and for once the usual 
suspects for abolition were able to function as net givers and substantial transfers were 
plentiful (see Appendix: Table 8).  
 
                                                 
44 Report by the Commissioners appointed for the purpose of redistributing the State of New South Wales 
into Electoral Divisions, 1934, C.P.P., v.2, No.233. 
45 Report by the Commissioners appointed for the purpose of redistributing the State of New South Wales 
into Electoral Divisions, 1948, C.P.P., v.5,  No.30. 
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Darling could provide 14 500 to one of the new divisions, called Bligh by the 
commissioners but its name was changed to Lawson by Parliament, and a further 4200 to 
Riverina and 300 to Gwydir. After being topped up with 3300 from Calare it was still a 
couple of thousand above the minimum. Riverina contributed 6000 to the second new 
division, which the commissioners proposed naming Farrer, and 8700 to the division they 
called Hume which had been the principal donor to the creation of Farrer, and was still 
comfortably above the minimum. Parliament subsequently swapped the two names 
around, designating as Farrer the southern division which contained both Albury and 
Wagga Wagga, and retaining the name of Hume for its northern neighbour which 
extended further along the Hume Highway. The third of the westernmost divisions, 
Gwydir, received 300 from Darling and another 1500 from New England but, after giving 
a massive 14 600 to Bligh-Lawson, was still well above the minimum.   
 
For the first time there could be new divisions in the big divisions area, two of them, and 
that could happen even though there was a substantial net loss of electors transferred out 
of the area. The old Hume had provided two-thirds of the enrolment of the new division 
which the commissioners proposed calling Farrer, and ordinarily that would have been a 
good reason for still calling it Hume. But the old Hume also had provided three-quarters 
of the enrolment of the division the commissioners wanted to call  Hume, and that might 
have been thought a stronger case. By contrast the new division further north, Bligh-
Lawson, received its electors in almost equal amounts from Darling and Gwydir, plus 
lesser numbers from Calare and New England, and clearly required a new name. Overall 
it appeared that, half a century on, the big divisions area in western New South Wales 
now included a south-eastern corner which was growing more rapidly than the rest of the 
area, even if that corner was not keeping up with the coast in general and the Newcastle-
Sydney-Wollongong urban conglomeration in particular. With the massive changes that 
creation of two new divisions involved, it was not surprising that the percentage of 
electors remained in their original divisions was low.  
 
 
The 1955 redistribution 
The government changed in 1949 and a redistribution was started in 1954 with a quota of 
43 482, but in so short a period of time minimal alterations were needed in the western 
part of the State, mainly tidying up based on electoral experience since 1949 (see 
Appendix: Table 9).46 Whilst New South Wales had lost a seat, down to 46, the 
permissible minimum had risen only to 34 786, and none of the nine big divisions was 
below that figure. Darling, which had been created close to the permissible bottom of the 
range in 1948, was within a thousand of the new figure and was given that many more 
electors. The most altered division, Macquarie on the areas eastern edge, still retained 
84.5 per cent of its original electors.   
 
When the new boundaries were put to the House of Representatives in May 1955, they 
produced an outburst from Eddie Ward  who was quite satisfied with what had 
happened to East Sydney  that was unusual for the allegation made: 
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But I must say, even if I hurt somebodys feelings, that I believe that considered 
upon a State basis these are the worst boundaries, from the viewpoint of an 
impartial consideration of such an important matter, that could possibly be fixed, 
and I have no hesitation in saying that this is probably the greatest illustration, at 
least in Commonwealth history, of the gerrymander of electorates.47 
 
As to general principles he agreed with the point made in the earlier debate about 
Queensland boundaries that the 20 per cent margin should be reduced, but he specified a 
matter concerning one of the inland divisions, Lawson. There had been, Ward said, a 
transfer of Coonamble from that very precarious seat to Darling already strongly held 
by Labour. (pp.1317-18). 
 
That brought out Lawrence Failes, Member for Lawson for the divisions entire life 
1949-69, who dealt with an aspect of the allegation that was not immediately apparent in 
Wards speech but presumably circulated in the parliamentary corridors: 
 
At the outset, let me say that I resent very strongly the veiled suggestion of the 
honourable member for East Sydney that I was a party to an attempt to influence 
the commissioners in my favour.  The commissioners gave me the courtesy of an 
interview.  After meeting them, I do not believe that they are the type of men who 
would be influenced by any one.  I lodged an objection and was granted 
permission to discuss it with the commissioners, but my objection was not upheld.  
Indeed, the original proposed redistribution of the Lawson was not altered. 
(pp.1318-19) 
 
He added that Ward had referred to Coonamble where Failes was behind by 370 votes, 
but failed to mention additions to the division where Labor was 540 ahead, so he had lost 
ground overall on the changes. The predominant interest in the latter was mining, and the 
debate then moved on to which of the mines were still operating. The exchange nicely 
illustrates how selective use of readily available evidence can cloud electoral debates. 
 
Wards suspicions were backed by Les Haylen who spoke of an ironclad gerrymander 
evidenced by the Victorian division held by the Prime Minister which had been left 
unaltered. Another member for one of the big divisions, New Englands David 
Drummond, wondered if changing the machinery to a judge assisted by assessors from 
the political parties might make outcomes more acceptable (p.1325). The report was 
subsequently adopted on a party vote.48 
 
 
The 1962 redistribution 
By 1962 the same government was still in office but it had had a nasty shock at the 1961 
general election, surviving by only one seat. Despite the post-war population boom New 
South Wales was due to lose a seat on the 1961 census figures, as were two other States; 
                                                 
47 C.P.D., v.HofR 6 (1 June 1955), p.1315. 
48 Ibid., (6 June 1955), p.1334. 
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Victoria was to gain one. As a consequence of the two factors the NSW quota had risen 
to 48 363 and the permissible minimum to 38 690.49 Only Darling was below the 
permissible minimum, but no big division was anywhere near equaling the quota. Once 
again it would be necessary for the big divisions area to lose a seat, and again Gwydir 
was chosen to be that division (see Appendix: Table 10). The other two westernmost 
divisions, Riverina and Darling, would require only topping up by a couple of thousand.  
Riverinas gain involved only Farrer which in turn would take more electors from Hume, 
but Darlings exchanges were slightly more complicated as they involved Gwydir and 
Lawson, the two divisions proposed for the most drastic changes. Gwydirs other major 
beneficiary, New England, had to export surplus electors from its western area and 
consequently involve the three coastal divisions north of Newcastle in restoring its 
numbers. More usually a few hundred electors along the mountain range that separated 
coast from inland might move east or west as was required and substantial movements 
were confined to the middle of the notional boundary to the west of the Hunter Valley 
and Sydney. 
 
Overall the 1962 proposals sought to tip a substantial number of electors (net 5.4 per cent 
of the areas original enrolment) out of the area to achieve what appeared to be their 
objective of keeping the big divisions clearly below the quota of 48 363. Six of the nine 
would have been just over 45 000, 93 per cent of the quota, and a seventh was just under. 
Only one (Macquarie) was near the quota at 47 000, and Darling, ever the problem child, 
was well below at 42 000 though still clear of the permissible minimum. However the 
Country Party was dissatisfied with the outcomes for divisions they held  in particular 
the disappearance of two safe seats, Gwydir, and Dawson in Queensland - and was ready 
to combine with the Labor Party to reject the proposals. That led to all six reports not 
being proceeded with.50   
 
When they had been tabled, the responsible minister had proposed changing the names of 
two metropolitan divisions and said defensively: 
 
These reports then are the decisions of independent men, appointed under a 
system devised, with the best skill which preceding Parliaments could devise, to 
prevent the accusation of party political considerations governing the very vital  
indeed the completely fundamental  aspect of a workable democracy, namely the 
election of members to the Parliament.51 
 
When the House returned to the matter, the Leader of the Opposition, Arthur Calwell, 
immediately moved disapproval. Variations from the quota were all over the place, and 
the six largest divisions in the country (which included Darling and three divisions in 
Queensland) had been allowed the maximum departure from the quota which did not 
                                                 
49 Report by the Commissioners appointed for the purpose of redistributing the State of New South Wales 
into Electoral Divisions, 1952, C.P.P., v.3, No.105. 
50 Peter Golding, 1996, Black Jack McEwen: Political Gladiator,  Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 
pp.209-10. 
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conform to CEA provisions. He went on to refer to a unanimous recommendation of the 
1959 Constitution Review Committee that the margin should be cut to 10 per cent.52   
 
The Country Party leader, John McEwen, responded with a lengthy speech which in 
passing criticized the commissioners in South Australia for considering future population 
trends when there was no such statutory criterion, and made the case for special 
provisions for rural divisions: 
 
We believe that the 20 per cent. discretionary departure from the quota, which has 
existed for almost 60 years, should be not only retained but also employed in a 
manner which will produce more healthy results for the Australian community.  
This provision could be used to give full weight to such consideration as means of 
communications.  We believe also that for rural constituencies the departure from 
the quota should average not less than 10 per cent., and that in the gigantic 
electorates which have been identified  there are half a dozen of them  the 
departure should be 20 per cent. (p.2879) 
 
Labors deputy leader, Gough Whitlam, equally eloquent, reiterated the case for more 
equality (pp.2879-87), after which the Prime Minister observed it was clear that the 
proposal was not going to be approved. As he said, whilst he was not in the mood to 
make an obituary speech the proposal was dead. Procedurally he could not move 
adjournment of the debate, so he would move that he continue his remarks at a later hour 
adding for good measure that I have not the slightest intention of continuing them. 
(p.2588). It might be added that an allocation of seats to States made under the 
constitutional provisions had not yet been recognised as justiciable. 
 
 
The 1968 redistribution 
In 1968 there had been another census and there was a different Prime Minister. The 
postponed redistribution took place under rules which had been modified in an important 
respect. In 1965 Peter Nixon, then a Country Party back-bencher but since 1967 the 
minister responsible for electoral matters, had put the case for making the redistribution 
process public with immediate access to the successive batches of public input. 
Consequently each of the 1968 commissioners reports was accompanied by a separate, 
larger volume containing the suggestions, comments and objections lodged with the 
commissioners, which for the first time were contemporaneously available for 
commentators and students.53 There was also a slim volume containing the dissent of the 
Chief Electoral Officer who had chaired the New South Wales commission from the 
majority (the NSW Commonwealth Electoral Officer and the states Deputy Surveyor-
General) decision on a section of the boundary between two divisions.54 New South 
Wales still had to lose a seat, enrolments had grown so that the quota was up to 52 805 
                                                 
52 Ibid., (4 December 1962), pp.2870-71). 
53 Hughes and Aitkin, The Federal Redistribution of 1968. 
54 Statement by Distribution Commissioner F.L. Ley showing reasons for dissent from proposals relating to 
the Divisions of Lyne and New England, 1968, Canberra. 
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and the permissible minimum to 42 244. Again a big division had to go (see Appendix: 
Table 11).55   
 
Three divisions in the area were below the permissible minimum  Hume and Lawson 
narrowly, Darling badly so; none was up to quota, with Macquarie the nearest to it at 50 
700.  Of the three westernmost divisions Riverina was left untouched, Darling received 
modest additions from Gwydir and Lawson, but whilst the third, Gwydir, survived this 
time it was going to be drastically altered when Lawson was abolished (see Appendix: 
Table 11). In addition to several small transfers to Darling and out of the area to Paterson, 
Gwydir having given 10 000 to New England received 20 000 from Lawson. The 
abolition of that division set off a diminishing chain sequence southwards of unusual 
length: Lawson 14 500 to Calare, Calare 11 300 to Hume, and Hume 2500 to Farrer. The 
remaining bits of Lawson went to Macquarie and Paterson. The matter about which the 
commissioners had divided was another transfer out of the area, 2100 from New England 
to Lyne.56   
 
For the first time, in another contribution to better informing any subsequent debate, the 
report showed the percentage deviation from quota of each proposed division and its area, 
its population at the recent (1966) census and population per square mile. Darling was the 
worst at 18.6 percentage points below quota, and Riverina, Calare, Hume and Gwydir 
were all more than10 percentage points below. New England and Farrer were between 10 
per cent and quota. Only Macquarie was above quota at 6.1 percentage points. It is about 
this time that a plausible case could be made for Macquaries exit from the category of 
big divisions for thereafter its transactions with its old associates, whether in or out, 
became relatively insignificant  until 2006 when a big division had to be abolished. 
 
When debate began Whitlam, now Leader of the Labor Party, sought to amend the 
motion for adoption by adding an expression of the Houses reluctance to do so, first 
because of  failure to recognize inequality of population, a point reflecting his personal 
preference for populations rather than enrolments when defining divisions, and to provide 
votes of equal value, and second for ignoring the Commonwealth Constitutions objective 
of making equal representation of equal numbers of people the fundamental ground of 
the House of Representatives.57 It appears from a complaint to the Speaker by a Liberal 
member that Len Devine, who had recently followed Ward in the division of East Sydney 
which was now scheduled to disappear, interjected about riding instructions for the 
commissioners. They were defended by the Country Partys Doug Anthony, the 
responsible minister before the redistribution started, who said that whilst his party was 
unhappy as they had lost a seat [Lawson], the redistribution had been too long delayed 
and: 
 
This redistribution has been carried out by commissioners, who have acted 
independently and honourably and have done their job to the letter of the law.  
                                                 
55 Report by the Distribution Commissioners appointed for the purpose of redistributing the State of New 
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56 Hughes and Aitkin, The Federal Redistribution of 1968, p.34. 
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Fewer aspersions or doubts have been cast on the commissioners in this 
redistribution than on any previous redistribution by the Commonwealth.  This is 
mainly because of amendments that were introduced to the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act.58 
 
He went on to complain that Whitlam had said the redistribution suffered from 
malapportionment rather than gerrymander on the ground that all three parties held 
country divisions. 
 
Whitlams amendment was rejected on a party vote, but the House then adopted a 
different amendment proposed by the Liberal MP who had complained about Devines 
interjection: 
 
but regrets that the Report did not have better regard to the trend of population 
changes in the State, which were not applied in a uniform manner in relation to all 
the other factors required to be taken into account.59 
 
The amendment was carried on party lines and the report then adopted, only to be 
reopened some days later to alter the name of a metropolitan division in New South 
Wales  and another in Victoria  to recognise two deceased Labor Prime Ministers, 
Chifley and Scullin.   
 
 
The 1975 redistribution 
The government changed in 1972, but the new governments intentions for major 
revisions in the CEA were frustrated by a hostile Senate. Only one change managed to 
slip through, reduction of the permitted variation from quota from 20 per cent to 10 per 
cent. That was possible because the amendment had been contained in one of the Bills 
that constituted justification for the double dissolution of 1974, and was subsequently 
passed by the joint sitting of Parliament held under the constitutional provision for 
resolving inter-cameral deadlocks. The ALP government was returned in 1974, but did 
not secure control of the Senate.  Nevertheless a redistribution was initiated, with the 
same number (45) of divisions allocated to New South Wales. Only two of the eight big 
divisions were by then above the new permitted minimum, Macquarie comfortably so 
and New England marginally. The commissioners proposed fairly substantial transactions 
across the areas eastern border, but they effectively cancelled out (see Appendix: Table 
12).    
 
Given the widespread shortfall of numbers with five divisions below the permissible 
minimum of 56 489, an existing division had to go and this time Riverina was selected. 
Almost four-fifths of its electors would have moved westwards into Darling, the balance 
north to Calare and east to Farrer. Darling, once again starting with the smallest 
enrolment, would receive 41 000 new electors and pass 24 000 on to Gwydir which 
would pass 12 000 to Paterson and so out of the big divisions area. The seven remaining 
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divisions all ended up close to the quota of 62 765, a very different outcome compared to 
the 1968 redistribution. Darling, despite retaining only 48.3 per cent of its original 
electors, would keep its name. The commissioners explained: 
 
A number of those who commented on the suggestions were objecting to any 
move which your Distribution Commissioners might make towards abolishing a 
rural division.  However, after consideration of the dispersal of the population 
throughout the State it was obvious that there were insufficient electors in the 
country to retain therein the existing number of electoral divisions.60 
 
Across the State they had abolished two metropolitan divisions and Riverina, and created 
three new metropolitan divisions.  
 
The responsible minister, Fred Daly, moved adoption of the report on 22 May 1975.61 He 
referred to the extent of public input  the commissioners had traveled to 37 centres to 
inform themselves directly and 13 boundaries had been altered in response to objections. 
But he anticipated the outcome by warning that the National Country Party leader, Doug 
Anthony, had said from the beginning that his party would not support any proposals 
despite the new legislation, and noted that the NCP had not lodged an initial submission 
until they had seen what was in the Liberal Partys.   
 
Anthony came out of his corner swinging: 
 
[The Ministers] speeches have not been objective speeches presenting a case to 
the Australian people.  They have reeked with party politics and they have done 
everything possible to poison the thinking of the Australian people against the 
country people and the National Country Party members who represent a majority 
of those people.  It has been a vendetta carried out against the Country people of 
the nation by a person who has a political hatred of country people.  The hatred 
reeks out of him.  He cannot control himself.62 
 
Anthony pointed out that the legislation in question was now being challenged in the 
High Court by the State governments of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, and 
suggested the old 20 per cent margin be written into the Commonwealth Constitution, an 
idea the Labor leader, Gough Whitlam, had endorsed in 1955. Gwydir and Kennedy in 
Queensland were mentioned, together with the traditional worst case, Kalgoorlie in 
Western Australia, and the rest of the world compared: 
 
Every democratic country except Australia provides for considerably smaller 
numbers of voters in large, scattered electorates than in tiny, compact city 
                                                 
60 Report by the Distribution Commissioners appointed for the purpose of redistributing New South Wales 
into Electoral Divisions, 1975, Canberra, p.3. 
61 C.P.D. v.HofR 95 (22 May 1975), pp.2716-20. 
62 Ibid., p.2720. 
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electorates  and that includes Britain where a tolerance of several hundred per 
cent is provided, Canada and the United States.63 
 
Moreover the reduction in tolerance had not only been applied, it had been taken to 
extremes so much so that the big enrolments were now in the country and the small 
enrolments in small city divisions. Finally, a new redistribution would be required after 
the 1976 census. The Member for Riverina added that the timetable for inputs had been 
too tight. 
 
The House approved the proposals by a party vote of 59-54 but when they were moved in 
the Senate they were promptly defeated 27-29, one of the two Independent Senators 
voting with the Opposition and the other absent. The Whitlam Government had 
anticipated this outcome, and promptly re-introduced each set of redistribution proposals 
embodied in a separate Bill which might then be used for the next double dissolution and 
so, even if the Senate remained hostile, could be carried at a subsequent joint sitting. The 
debates on the Bills added little to the subject, save that the deputy leader of the NCP 
called the legislation the gerrymander which the Labor Party sought to introduce, and 
Daly pointed out that the Labor Party currently held 20 country seats. The Bills were 
passed by the House and defeated in the Senate on much the same numbers as had been 
the original proposals. 
   
 
The 1977 redistribution 
The government was removed in the constitutional crisis a few months later, and the 
incoming government chose not to restore the 20 per cent limits around quota, but instead 
tied the commissioners hands more firmly to the benefit of rural divisions by extending 
the quantitative criterion in the CEA. No division having an area of 5000 square 
kilometers or more should have more electors than any division having an area less than 
that. Effectively all rural divisions should have fewer electors than any urban division. 
With area now a material consideration, the table in each report which listed the proposed 
divisions had to add divisional areas to divisional enrolments and percentage deviations 
from quota. The change was applied in a redistribution of all the States only in 1977, and 
at a subsequent redistribution of Western Australia in 1979. Application of the area 
quantitative criterion had only a limited effect for New South Wales in 1977, for in the 
advantaged rural divisions the average enrolment was only approximately 3500 less than 
the average in the disadvantaged remaining divisions. 
 
Another change to the rules at this point was the requirement that allocation of seats 
among the States (and Territories) be calculated early in the life of each new House of 
Representatives, and if a change occurred then a redistribution had to take place of that 
State (or Territory). The second change, about timing, has applied ever since.   
 
In the eastern part of the big divisions area, Macquarie was well above the quota of      
71 149 and two other divisions, Farrer and New England, were safely over the 
permissible minimum of 64 035. However shortfalls further west were large enough to 
                                                 
63 Ibid., p.2721. 
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require that one division be abolished (see Appendix: Table 13). Large transfers both 
ways across the area boundary cancelled out, but the most substantial impacted on 
Paterson which shifted westwards, giving up 16 700 electors to Newcastle and Lyne 
whilst collecting 23 200 from three divisions on its western side. Nevertheless the 49 800 
it retained from the old Paterson are sufficient to continue to exclude it from the big 
divisions area for current purposes.   
 
The division chosen for abolition in 1977 was Darling which was shared in remarkably 
equal portions between Gwydir (24 458 electors) and Riverina (24 709). Their 
consequent areas were also similar, Gwydir at 242 672 sq.km. and Riverina at 251 777 
sq.km., and their enrolments similarly distanced from the quota, Gwydir 4.3 per cent 
below and Riverina 3.5 per cent below. Only one other division had an area that exceeded 
50 000 sq.km., Hume which was just over. Macquarie, shrunk to a mere 1839 sq.km., 
was renamed Lawson by the commissioners, but the Parliament restored its old name.  
Only New England retained all its original electors, Calare and Macquarie were 
drastically altered, more so than the two which accommodated the break-up of Darling, 
Gwydir and Riverina.  For the area as a whole the retention statistic was slightly lower 
than at the previous, rejected redistribution. 
 
The report came up for debate on 27 October 1977. Anthony was now defending the 
proposals against an ALP allegation that changes made after the objections had been 
favourable to the Liberals (in particular the former Prime Minister, William McMahon, 
whose seat in Sydney appeared to be marginal and was subsequently lost in a by-election 
after his retirement). Any complaints about manipulations or gerrymanders produced 
the rejoinder that in New South Wales the Whitlam Government had made the five seats 
with the largest number of voters  enormous country electorates.64  
 
More to the point about possible malpractice was the intervention of a Queensland 
Liberal, Kevin Cairns, on the subject of divisional name changing to raise his own  
States redistribution: 
 
I am fascinated as to what causes them to change.  I say to the House I am totally 
convinced they [the commissioners] acted on evidence other than that presented 
to them in public documents.65 
 
He went on to explain why divisional names were important in Queensland  because of 
the terms of the agreement on which the Coalition rested  and to point to the fact that a 
name had been changed prior to the final report in Queensland.  That change of name was 
subsequently investigated by a Royal Commission.66  
 
                                                 
64 C.P.D. v.HofR 107 (27 October 1977), p.2531. 
65 Ibid., p.2537. 
66 Royal Commission of Inquiry: Matters in Relation to Electoral Redistribution Queensland 1977, Report, 
1978, Canberra, AGPS. 
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A more reflective comment came from J.W. Sullivan, Member for Riverina, whose 
division on this occasion had been combined with Darling and at the previous failed 
redistribution had disappeared completely: 
 
I say at the outset, that I have nothing to say against the work done by the 
redistribution commissioners.  To put it bluntly, if we give a group of men a 
stupid task we must expect a stupid answer.  The commissioners were given a 
stupid task in 1974-75.  They were given a stupid task this year.  Nothing will 
change that situation.  The arguments tonight have been put forward by those who 
see political variations in the boundaries drawn by commissioners.  After all, what 
is this game but a political game.  If we cannot accept the decision of the umpire 
we should not play in the match.67 
 
The proposals were then accepted by a low vote on party lines. 
 
 
New South Wales 1984-2006 
 
The 1984 redistribution 
In 1983 the government changed, and the incoming government established a joint select 
committee of Parliament to consider electoral reform.68 Its recommendations ranged 
widely; two matters not previously mentioned which are particularly relevant to this 
study were that commissioners were required to give reasons for their proposals and area 
was added to the subjective criteria. Finally, the extension of public involvement in the 
redistribution process led to two, sometimes significantly different, set of proposals being 
prepared for them and subsequently published. With two sets of reasons now available, 
the commissioners ideas and their interaction with public input became much more 
accessible. 
 
Enlargement of membership of the House of Representatives to 148 had increased New 
South Wales entitlement to 51 seats, up eight, causing the quota to decline slightly, 
down to 65 907, and the permissible minimum to 59 316. Each existing division was 
comfortably above quota, and as the big divisions area now contained 8.2 quotas the 
redistribution committee members, who included the present writer ex officio, could add a 
further division if they wished. Instead, in their initial proposals they stuck with seven 
divisions and exported the extra quota of electors by moving the areas boundary 
westwards, to the benefit of Paterson and two new divisions, Gilmore and Lindsay, which 
were linked eastwards to the Illawarra and Sydney regions respectively. Within the 
diminished area they identified two main problems: the presence of two large and 
growing provincial cities, Albury and Wagga Wagga, in the same division, Farrer, and 
the character of the existing division of Riverina. The first was dealt with by surgery on 
Farrer and Hume, the second by reviving a division called Darling and causing Riverina 
to disappear.69 
                                                 
67 C.P.D. v.HofR 107 (27 October 1977), p.2550. 
68 Joint Select Committee on Electoral Reform, 1983, First Report, Canberra, AGPS. 
69 1984 Redistribution of New South Wales into Electoral Divisions, 1984, v.1, Canberra, AGPS, p.115. 
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At the area level, the proportion of electors who would remain in their original divisions, 
those drawn in 1977, dropped to a new low, beating the previous record set in 1948 when 
the first enlargement of the House of Representatives had taken place. Developments 
outside the area led to major changes to the initial proposals. In a cross-border transfer 
Paterson was to receive over a quarter of a quota of electors from Calare plus 2000 more 
from Gwydir, pass almost half a quota on to Hunter and thereby move westwards.   
 
At the subsequent round of hearings, the indignation that such a change to Paterson had 
produced led the augmented commission to rethink its starting point and to create an 
eighth division in the area. The massive movement of electors from Macquarie to 
Lindsay on the western outskirts of Sydney was retained, but Paterson was abolished and 
instead of receiving electors from them sent even more to Calare and Gwydir. That 
allowed a new division, named Parkes after the Father of Federation, to be created to the 
west of Gwydir using 37 000 electors from Gwydir, 16 500 from Calare, 12 600 from 
Hume, and a handful from the defunct Paterson. There had previously been a division 
named Parkes, located in the middle of Sydney, which was abolished in 1968. The new 
one extended far enough south to include the town of Parkes but that was not the point. 
The division that now lay between the new division of Parkes and the South Australian 
border was re-named Riverina-Darling, drawn predominantly (83 per cent of a quota) 
from the old Riverina and topped up from Gwydir and Hume. Gwydir plummeted from 
83.0 per cent to 41.0 per cent of its old electors, and the area retention figure dropped still 
further.   
 
Those who had been critical of the new Paterson were startled to see it disappear and be 
replaced by Parkes. To cover a situation where the augmented commission started what 
was at least in part a new ball-game, the CEA was amended to provide, first, an 
opportunity for a second round of objections and, second, public hearings if the 
augmented commission made substantial changes to the redistribution committees 
proposals.  Thereafter there could be three sets of reasons stated during a redistribution: 
the initial reasons forming part of the report of the redistribution committee, the proposal 
for the redistribution forming part of the report of the augmented commission and, if 
necessary, the reasons for the determination made by the augmented commission. 
 
 
The 1992 redistribution 
In 1992, New South Wales lost a seat, and the redistribution took place with an increased 
quota of 73 513 and a permissible minimum of 66 162. One division, Riverina-Darling, 
had fallen below permissible minimum, but only two, Macquarie and New England, were 
above quota and only Macquarie by much.  With only 7.8 quotas to start with, the 
redistribution committee modified the area boundary substantially and made up the 
shortfall by a net importation of electors (see Appendix: Table 15).   
 
To digress briefly, Gilmore which was involved in the boundary changes, had originally 
been criticised in 1984 for extending across the big divisions boundary from Cowra to 
Nowra. In fact it largely corresponded to the original (1901-3) Werriwa that had 
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extended even further west to a point beyond Cowra. From 1934 onwards Werriwa had 
gradually crept north-eastwards until in 1948 it completed its metamorphosis into a 
peripheral metropolitan division. Gilmore remained virtually unchanged in 1999, but in 
2006 resumed the process that it had started in 1992, shedding inland electors who were 
in the minority and becoming more clearly coastal in character.   
 
As for the perpetual far western problem, the redistribution committee referred to 
dissatisfaction with the existing Riverina-Darling, and reverted to having two divisions. 
One was based on the region traditionally known as the Riverina and its several 
irrigation areas and reclaimed that name. The other, comprising the grazing and mining 
western part of the State, would absorb the western part of Riverina-Darling into Parkes.  
Thus two post-Federation divisions, Farrer (dating from 1948) and Parkes (from 1984) 
now ran along the border with South Australia instead of the original (1901) Barrier and 
Riverina. Paterson was resurrected, composed of parts of several Hunter Valley and 
coastal divisions but now well away from the concerns of the western and middle parts of 
the State.   
 
At the augmented commission stage there was some grumbling about the inclusion in 
Riverina of some centers which were said to look to Albury and consequently should be 
in the division of Farrer. Subject to some very minor revisions, the proposals for Riverina 
and all the other divisions were upheld, but the two State officials dissented on the 
Riverina proposals at both redistribution committee and augmented commission stages.70 
 
 
The 1999 redistribution 
In 1999 the number of seats allocated to New South Wales remained unchanged. The 
quota, 82 202, was exceeded in the big divisions area by only one division, Macquarie, 
and the permitted minimum, 66 162, was missed only by Riverina, so the majority of 
divisions in the area were relatively close together. On the other hand, the area 
collectively contained only 7.5 quotas. Instead of abolishing a division and exporting the 
resulting surplus, the redistribution committee maintained the same number of divisions 
and moved 38 500 electors from a generously endowed outer metropolitan division, 
Macarthur, into Hume (see Appendix: Table 16). To dispose of the resultant surplus and 
at the same time solve a number of shortfalls, Hume transferred out almost as many, the 
largest batch going to Riverina, its worst-off neighbor  and even 1000 eastwards across 
the area boundary. For the area as a whole the retention statistic was the best it had been 
since 1955. The report introduced a displacement statistic calculated at approximately 
11% of the electors, which is an alternative to the retention statistic used in this paper. 
In the second round the augmented commission made only one tiny adjustment involving 
380 electors. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 1992 Redistribution of New South Wales into Electoral Divisions, 1992, v.1, Canberra, AGPS, p.11.  
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Gwydir: a brief recapitulation 
So much of the dissatisfaction with the 2006 redistribution was focused on Gwydir that 
before examining that redistribution in some detail it might be helpful to extract and 
repeat that divisions experience over the previous century as is evidenced in its retention 
statistics. Prior to 2006, and excluding 1903 because the necessary figures are 
unavailable, there were 18 occasions when Gwydirs boundaries came under review. 
Since the 1983 changes the provisional and final reports could be counted separately, but 
for 1999 the provisional version was confirmed in the final report. It was never left alone, 
though several times the retention rate was 98 per cent or better. Six times (1906, 1912 
first report, 1912 third report, 1922, 1955, 1968, 1975, 1977, 1984 proposed, 1999) it was 
only slightly changed. Eight times it was substantially changed. Five times (1931, 1934, 
1948, 1992 proposed, 1992 final) it fell below the cut-off point for substantially and 
slightly within the 70-75 per cent range), and three times it was very substantially altered. 
In the 1912 second report the retention rate fell to 46.4 per cent and a change of name to 
Namoi was suggested; in 1962 the division would have been abolished; and in 1984 final 
report the retention rate fell to 41.0 per cent but the name Gwydir continued even though 
49.2 per cent of its electors had gone into the new division called Parkes. It could be said 
that Gwydir had had three near-death experiences prior to 2006. 
 
As for the other biggest and westernmost divisions, Barrier always had a 100 per cent 
retention rate until its abolition because it invariably had to be topped up. That was the 
case with Darling too until 1922 when it was caught up in the abolition of Barrier.  
Darling then swung between very substantial changes (62.1 per cent, 48.3 per cent) in 
years when the House had been enlarged and there were more divisions to be drawn 
(1948, 1984) and high retention rates (1931, 1934, 1955, 1962) or no change (1968), until 
it vanished into Riverina in 1977. Riverina was proposed for abolition twice (1912 
second report, 1975) and twice experienced substantial change (1948, 1992 proposed). 
There were four occasions (1931, 1934, 1962, 1968) when Riverina reported no change, 
and for the remainder it was only slightly changed. Loss of enrolment, relative or 
absolute, put all four of these divisions at risk regularly, and two wild cards  whether 
transfers across the areas notional boundary increased or reduced the pressure for 
abolishing a division, and whether enlargement of House membership occurred to reduce 
the pressure  contributed substantially to how the problem was resolved. 
 
Another long perspective is provided by following the location of Dubbo which, as by far 
the largest city in the northwestern sector of the area, can be seen as the pivot around 
which other divisions have to move. Dubbo started off in Robertson, went to Darling in 
1906, to Gwydir in 1922, returned to Darling in 1934, into the new division of Lawson in 
1949, back to Gwydir in 1968, and finally into the new division of Parkes in 1984 where 
it has stayed ever since. Drawing divisional boundaries in the north-western part of the 
area since 1906 has in large part meant deciding where Dubbo is to go (about which the 
CEA offers little help), and then rearranging everybody else to comply with the statutory 
limitations on numbers, whilst at the same time recognizing community of interest when 
and where it is possible to do so.   
 
  39
In the beginning Broken Hill offered an alternative large urban centre focus in the far 
west, but so close to the South Australian border that it could not act as a pivot, only as a 
large building block. Once it could no longer justify a division of its own, redistribution 
commissioners dealing with it were left with two choices, going south from Broken Hill 
and then up the Murray along the State border as far as was necessary to achieve a quota, 
or else seeking a quota by going due east in the direction of Dubbo whilst keeping the 
border with Queensland on the left. Following the abolition of Barrier, Broken Hill took 
the second option, went into Darling and stayed there until 1977, but Dubbo was rarely in 
the same division. It would have been from 1931 had those proposals been accepted, and 
it was from 1934 to 1948. But when the first option was adopted and Broken Hill moved 
into Riverina in 1977, Dubbo remained in Gwydir. When Broken Hills division became 
Riverina-Darling and backed away from the Murray River in 1984, Dubbo could be 
moved into Parkes.   
 
Thus, apart from one brief period 1934-48, the two cities had never been in the same 
division until 1992 by which stage Broken Hill itself contained only 23 per cent of the 
prevailing quota compared to Dubbos 28 per cent. At the 1999 redistribution those 
figures were 19 per cent and 29 per cent respectively, and when the 2006 redistribution 
committee proposed sending Broken Hill off to Riverina once more they were 16 per cent 
and 28 percent respectively, which certainly entitled Dubbo to possession of the field. 
Broken Hill then joined a division with an even larger city at the opposite end of the 
division, Albury with 35 per cent of a quota. 
     
To anticipate the next section briefly, in 2006 the redistribution committee decided to 
eliminate one division by combining Gwydir and Parkes, and thereby create a large 
surplus, and to move 39 000 electors, well over the significant transfer line, from Calare 
to Macquarie. It then reflected that it could restore Calares numbers with either Dubbo 
plus one smaller centre, or with four smaller centres. The first option would help dispose 
of the surplus, but it was flawed. 
 
In considering these possibilities the committee noted that the removal of Dubbo 
from Parkes would result in that division not containing a major regional centre. 
The committee noted that such a move would have extended Calare further west 
to obtain the required electors and would have created a division based on tenuous 
communities of interest.71  
 
In the event a different set of calculations allowed Dubbo to stay in Parkes/Gwydir and 
the surplus to be moved from Parkes/Gwydir to Calare to Macquarie and finally out of 
the area into Greenway which had been created in 1984. 
  
 
The 2006 NSW redistribution 
New South Wales had once more lost a seat, the quota was 87 931 and the permissible 
minimum 79 138. The big divisions area contained 7.5 quotas and so could move either 
                                                 
71 2006 Proposed Redistribution of New South Wales into Electoral Divisions, n.d. ,Canberra, AEC, p.19. 
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way: bring in half a quota and retain the eight divisions or move half a quota out and 
settle for seven. The redistribution committee noted that population had declined in the 
north and north-west of the State but was holding steady in the center and south-west, and 
the reports map illustrating enrolment trends showed four of the declining divisions 
stretching out on an east-west axis and the fifth, New England, on a north-south axis. It 
proceeded to state a set of principles it would apply after taking into account the criteria 
contained in the Electoral Act wherever possible.  The principles might also be seen as a 
useful gloss on those criteria rather than creating alternatives: 
 
reflecting the movement  of western electors towards major centres 
upholding and restoring divisional communities of interest 
ensuring means of communication and travel were considered 
diminishing historical constraints imposed by geographical regions and 
features in the light of improving communications and transport 
minimising the extent of elector movement to proposed divisions.72 
 
The application of those principles in a situation of declining enrolments led the 
redistribution committee to the conclusion that Gwydir and Parkes should be merged, and 
thereby they could work to seven divisions.   
 
At the same time the redistribution committee advanced a concept of the regional links 
which connected the states main areas, rural, coastal and metropolitan. These links were 
the long-established road and rail corridors and they could be used to deal with continued 
population drift by linking under-populated areas west of the Great Dividing Range with 
remedial population sources east of the Range  a process which had been spoken of 
earlier in this paper as moving the western areas only adjustable boundary. Finally the 
committee went on to create what might be thought a new and reasonable criterion that 
all rural districts should contain one major centre, but it could also be considered an 
application of the existing community of interest criterion.73 
 
Employment of these considerations led to the usual range of varying consequences for 
the several divisions (see Appendix: Table 17). New England remained intact with a 
small addition, and Riverina did almost as well. Farrer and Hume were only marginally 
altered. But the other three divisions had retention rates barely over the half mark: Calare, 
Macquarie and Parkes. The area collectively had a low retention rate, and there had been 
substantial border-crossing transfers with a net loss of 68 000 electors eastwards, very 
much the ultimate reflection of the commissioners statistic that the merger of Gwydir 
and Parkes had produced 82 000 surplus electors who had to be moved somewhere else. 
 
The disappearance of Gwydir produced a wave of criticism evidenced by the 1,989 
objections lodged to the redistribution. Bennetts Research Brief for the Parliamentary 
Library74 provides an admirable account which need not be duplicated here. Despite the 
scale of protest, it was unsuccessful for the reasons the augmented commission set out. 
                                                 
72 Ibid., p.18. 
73 Ibid., p.26. 
74 Bennett, Save Country Seats. 
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As a common response to criticism of a particular division is to complain that the critic(s) 
should suggest an alternative solution, it might be noted that several objectors including 
the federal leader of the National Party and the partys deputy leader in the Senate, both 
representing New South Wales electors, specified the metropolitan, and safe for the 
Labor Party, seat of Blaxland as a suitable sacrificial substitute. More of a look in the 
rear-view mirror was provided by the partys former federal leader who was Deputy 
Prime Minister when the 5,000 sq.km. criterion was added to the statutory criteria: 
 
I have always been conscious that if democracy is to work fairly and with justice 
some allowance needs to be made in the voting system to compensate for the 
remoteness or inability of the elected representative to be in close contact with the 
voters. While Australia seems to have unfairly glossed over the principal [sic] 
most other countries do give a weighting for this factor.75 
 
How much weighting and which other countries is left to the reader to find out for 
themselves though presumably his remarks 30 years earlier in 1975 already cited would 
help.  Nor was there a suggestion that the parliamentary veto which had worked so 
effectively in 1962 should be restored. But before suggesting remedies it may be time to 
see how the system worked in a different state.  
 
 
Queensland 1901-48 
Applications of the CEAs redistribution rules to Queensland encounter a geographical 
situation quite unlike the one we have just been examining. In 1901 only nine divisions 
were allocated to the State, only four of which resembled those in the western part of 
New South Wales. The remaining five divisions, urban or closely-settled rural, occupied 
the south-eastern corner of the State. The boundary between the two blocs of divisions 
was shorter than in New South Wales, and the opportunities to move enrolment surpluses 
or deficits across that boundary more limited. Although such a boundary was never given 
statutory recognition, serious players believed that one existed. For example, the Liberal 
Partys Queensland division put to the commissioners of 1968: 
 
Our primary suggestion is that the Commissioners should retain two (2) 
categories of electoral Divisions, namely Metropolitan and Extra-Metropolitan. 
These categories have become universally understood and accepted. There is no 
need nor facility for any other category in Queensland. An identifiable boundary 
between the Metropolitan and the Extra-Metropolitan Divisions was established 
by the redistribution of 1948.76 
 
Recognising that boundary would have added the two divisions, Wide Bay and Darling 
Downs, labeled closely-settled rural earlier in the paragraph, to the four more remote, 
                                                 
75 Public Objection Number 504: The Right Hon. J.D. Anthony. 
76 1968 Redistribution of the State of Queensland into Electoral Divisions – Volume II: Copies of the 
Suggestions, Comments or Objections lodged with the Distribution Commissioners for the State of 
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larger, and thinly-settled with which this paper is concerned.  After the 1948 
redistribution Fisher became a third member in that intermediary category of division.     
 
A second distinguishing feature was that Queenslands basic transport and 
communication system had developed differently from the New South Wales system. 
Instead of a single railway network radiating out from Sydney, three separate systems had 
been laid down, running westwards from the ports of Townsville, Rockhampton and 
Brisbane, and only gradually joined together by a south-to-north line which ran along the 
coast and eventually reached Cairns. This fragmentation of transport and communications 
produced a three-layered State so clearly divided that a provision of the Commonwealth 
Constitution (s.7) had allowed Queensland to elect its six senators from three separate 
upper house divisions if it wished to do so. It did not wish that, and the occasional new 
state movements which sought to remove North Queensland and even Central 
Queensland from the State failed to get off the ground. Nevertheless attempts to 
recognize community of interest outside the metropolitan area had to cope with not only 
the continent-wide trinity of mining, pastoral and agricultural economic interests, but also 
at least three geographical interests, possibly four if Far North Queensland and its port at 
Cairns were to be dealt a hand. Finally, the influence of inter-state boundaries was much 
less obvious. Maranoa always accounted for the NSW and South Australian borders, and 
the only uncertainty was the extent to which it shared the Northern Territory border with 
Kennedy. 
 
In 1901 the Queensland legislature, using the States electoral districts as building blocks, 
had created the four divisions which are of interest for this paper. Maranoa, on the 
railways southern line, started as soon as closer settlement on the Darling Downs thinned 
out and ran along the NSW border to South Australia and the Northern Territory. 
Capricornia extended along the central line almost to Barcaldine and up the coast from 
Gladstone almost to Mackay; Rockhampton was its principal center. Herbert occupied the 
rest of the coast up to and including Cape York peninsula, and contained three major 
urban centers  Cairns, Townsville and Mackay. Kennedy, the principal center of which 
was a mining town, Charters Towers, occupied the rest of inland Queensland. It spread 
along the western part of the central line and almost all of the northern line and, at the 
end of a long border with Maranoa, reached the upper half of the Northern Territory 
boundary. These four divisions remain the only players of concern here until the 
enlargement of the House of Representatives in 1949 when another two, Leichhardt and 
Dawson, joined the field. The narrative of this part of the paper will concern transfers 
among those four together with, for the most part minor, transactions with the south-
eastern area divisions they touched  Wide Bay and Darling Downs, and after 1949 
Fisher as well.  
 
 
The 1903 redistribution 
 The redistribution proposed in 1903 was based on a quota of 24 675 and a permissible 
minimum of 19 792. Only Kennedy at 18 897 required remedial action, but the 
continuing use of State electoral districts as building blocks led to the transfer of a large 
area, Cook electoral district  effectively the whole of Cape York peninsula, from 
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Herbert. The report77 reproduced two objections received, from the Cairns Political and 
Progress Association and the Member for Herbert, F.W. Bamford. The Association 
lamented the loss to Kennedy and was concerned with the relationship between area and 
effective representation, and with communities of interest: 
 
No one man could have adequately represented the pastoral, mining, and coastal 
agricultural interests comprised in so large an area [as Kennedy], nor could he 
have visited even a fair proportion of the centres with a view to obtain on the one 
hand, an idea of the needs of the electors; or, on the other, to satisfy them that this 
candidate was a fit and proper person to represent them. 
 
Moreover, we as electors resident in the district hitherto under the influence of the 
above League felt that we were practically disfranchised owing to the 
preponderance of voters concerned in the pastoral and mining industries, and who 
would probably return a candidate possessed of none of that expert knowledge 
which is required by one who aspires fairly to represent the interests of tropical 
agriculture.78 
 
Bamford threw in another community of interest point - the lack of it between the 
graziers of the west and the pearlers of Thursday Island, whilst the Association observed 
that Kennedy and Maranoa together occupied two-thirds of the States area but contained 
less than a sixth of its enrolment. 
 
When the report came before the House of Representatives on 18 August 1903, William 
Lyne as the responsible Minister immediately moved disapproval. The reason he put 
forward was the drought  as it had been argued for New South Wales, but there was also 
a complaint by the Member for Capricornia, Alexander Paterson, that the 20 per cent 
deviation from quota was too narrow for rural divisions, to which Andrew Fisher, the 
Member for Wide Bay, said 25 per cent would have been preferable. A South Australian 
MP, Charles Kingston, who had resigned from the ministry a month earlier over 
industrial relations legislation, alleged that the commissioner, who was a State public 
servant, had been improperly interviewed by two State ministers, the Premier and the 
Minister for Railways. The commissioners status was analogous to that of a judge, 
Kingston thought, and all communications to him should be in writing.79   
 
Three more non-Queenslanders joined the debate. Patrick Glynn, backed by Isaac Isaacs, 
raised the question whether the Minister had to refer the matter back to the commissioner 
if Parliament had disapproved, and concluded that the CEA required it. Joseph Cook 
defended the power to reject: 
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No one has ever set up the contention that we must perforce accept the dictation 
of the Commissioner. No one has put forward an absurd proposition of that kind; 
not has any one said that we should surrender ourselves politically, body and soul 
into the hands of the Commissioner.80 
 
That surrender had to wait another 80 years. For the time being the House voted 37-16 to 
reject as Protectionists and Labor defeated Free Traders. 
 
 
The 1906 redistribution 
By 1906 with a quota of 26 019 and a permissible minimum of 20 815 only one of the 
four divisions, Herbert, remained above the permitted minimum. The commissioner 
declared his intention to cause the least disturbance whilst complying with the criteria 
(see Appendix: Table 18). Herbert was left as it was.  Kennedy could be enlarged only 
from Maranoa and moved south. The size of Maranoas deficit required both expansion 
eastwards into Darling Downs and north-east into Capricornia. Capricornia remedied its 
own and the areas deficits by extending south along the coast to include Bundaberg. In 
the commissioners opinion that made it an eastern maritime Division,81 but 
Rockhamptons role as the rail-head and urban hub for the central part of the State left it 
a division properly included in the area which is of interest for this paper.   
 
The State electoral districts, usually kept whole but split occasionally, continued to be 
designated as the building blocks. Expansion of the railway system (which continued in 
Queensland for some time after it had virtually ended in New South Wales) could be used 
to justify transfers, but problems had been created by changes relevant to the criteria: 
 
Some of these boundaries, owing to the progress of settlement and the extension 
of surveys, are not now quite appropriate, therefore, in such cases, although 
existing boundaries have been practically adhered to, they have been made to 
conform to the later conditions.82 
 
In the commissioners opinion, at the statewide level the scale of deviation from the 
quota was well within the statutory limits, and should avoid any need for redistribution 
until the number of seats was altered unless some unexpected movements of population 
occur. Closely-settled divisions with smaller areas were put above the quota, and the 
sparsely-populated larger divisions below it.83 Unfortunately the reports of this period are 
less than comprehensive for the exact numbers of electors being moved and may refer to 
enrolments within State districts, and consequently a few statistics are approximations.  
 
The Senate accepted the proposals without debate, but when Littleton Groom, the 
responsible Minister (and Member for the division of Darling Downs, which was later 
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renamed Groom in his honour and that of his father  the only transported convict to sit 
in the Commonwealth Parliament, albeit for only a few weeks prior to his death in 
190184), moved acceptance in the House, Sir John Forrest raised the problem of big 
divisions and use of the 20 per cent margin. Groom agreed the vastness of the divisions 
was a difficulty for the commissioner and instanced adjacent Maranoa (742 000 
sq.km.).85 The brief debate then moved on to divisional names. There was already a State 
district named Kennedy which could lead to confusion, and Bamford thought it might 
better be called Browne after a State Minister of Mines (1899, 1903-04).Groom thought 
Artesia might be preferable for Maranoa which was also the name of a State district. 
 
 
The 1912 redistributions 
In 1912 there were three commissioners. On the first try they failed to agree.  The 
chairman, an assistant under-secretary from the States Home Secretarys department, 
and the Chief Surveyor submitted a majority report dated 21st June,86 but the Electoral 
Offices W.H. Graham dissented, mainly over Maranoas boundaries. There had been 
some growth in enrolments, the quota was up to 31 388 and the permissible minimum to 
25 111. Sub-divisions had been introduced in 1908 and were now the official building 
blocks. Only Kennedy was below the minimum; remarkably the other three were above 
quota, Herbert so much so that it had the largest enrolment in the State.    
 
The majority proposed that Herbert retain the Cape York peninsula (see Appendix: Table 
19). Initially the intention had been to add Kennedys Gulf of Carpentaria coast to 
Herbert (an idea never advanced again) and, a move which ever since would be 
controversial whenever anything like it has been proposed or undertaken, extend 
Kennedy through to the Pacific Ocean by giving it some coastal strip between Bowen and 
Mackay. Capricornia reverted to its pre-1906 character by returning the Bundaberg area 
to Wide Bay and moving west once more at the expense of Maranoa. The majority report 
noted that there had been complaints about mixing coastal and western areas, but 
Rockhampton was their natural outlet and the central line serviced the whole division.87 
As for controversial Maranoa, the majoritys solution was to leave it reduced in area and 
with an enrolment now well below the quota. An indication of relative differences in 
impact of the transfer of thinly-settled areas is that Maranoa would lose about 20 per cent 
of its previous area (742 000 sq.km.) and Capricornia gained more than 150 per cent of 
its previous area (71 000 sq.km.) in the same transaction that involved only 8100 electors. 
 
What went on in that transferred area was the concern of the main thrust of the dissenting 
report.88 Graham began by complaining that the 1908 sub-divisional boundaries had been 
too much ignored by the majority; they would have to be re-done at some expense in the 
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near future to recognize overdue changes of the State electoral districts.89 He then 
proposed some minor changes reflecting railway extensions, and an area being better 
served for electoral administration purposes. His most substantial complaint concerned 
was the transfer from Maranoa to Capricornia. A sheep-raising area was moved from a 
division which was nothing but sheep-raising to one which had no sheep, when 
compliance with quota requirements could have been met without the change. Moreover, 
Capricornia had been the third fastest growing division in the State since 1906, the 
boundaries of nine Commonwealth sub-divisions would be affected, and the Barcoo State 
electoral district boundary which had been used to define the transfer was likely to 
change in the near future.90 The practice of showing in redistribution reports which State 
electoral districts fitted into which federal divisions became essential when recognition of 
the State electoral boundaries was made a statutory criterion in 1918 and reports 
continued to do this until 1962.  
 
Graham followed his dissenting report with a second document dated 12th July.91 It 
pointed out that Herberts surplus was much the same size as Kennedys deficit, and 
equal to the numbers involved in the transfer of Bowen and Mackay and argued that there 
were two sugar-growing areas in Herbert and the southern one could be split off. (The 
sugar industry which had opened up much of coastal Queensland had survived the end 
of indentured labour and the repatriation of a proportion of the Pacific Islander workforce 
at the beginning of the century, and continued to be the principal factor for growth and 
settlement between Cairns and Mackay.) True it would introduce what Graham called a 
foreign interest into Kennedy, but no other practicable solution to the problem could be 
found. 
 
On 23rd July King OMalley, the responsible minister, moved agreement to the majority 
report. Bamford (still the Member for Herbert) observed darkly that in 1903 he had 
made a charge of gerrymandering against some person or persons unknown with the 
result that the distribution was rejected92 and moved the matter be referred back to the 
commissioners.That was carried 27-25 on a free vote.   
 
The commissioners returned a month later with a unanimous report (see Appendix: Table 
20).93 It complained that Parliament had given no indication of the grounds on which the 
proposed distribution was rejected, apart from the speech by Bamford. That difficulty 
remained until 1983 when the power to reject was abolished. Mackay and Bowen were 
again seen as a foreign interest if they went to Kennedy and split the northern sugar 
interest, then contained wholly in Herbert, for Mackay had been called Sugaropolis in 
the 19th century. A tiny part was more Kennedy than it was Herbert and that could be 
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moved, and the bit near Mackay could still go to Capricornia, but that was all. Kennedys 
deficit would have to be met at the expense of Capricornia.   
 
The result of the changes was to recognize area and spread the four divisions out. Herbert 
still the largest in enrolment was well above quota, Capricornia was just on quota, and the 
two largest divisions, Kennedy a bit below quota and Maranoa at 27 600 was still well 
clear of the permissible minimum. The second report was accepted on 10th October 
without a division, though Bamford continued to grumble and was supported in his 
complaints by the Member for Capricornia. 
 
 
The 1922 redistribution 
In 1921 the commissioners, with Sowers back and now the chairman, began by formally 
separating the States divisions into three metropolitan and seven extra-metropolitan. The 
two divisions largest in area and nearing the permissible minimum of 31 337, Kennedy 
and Maranoa, would go below the quota of 39 171 (see Appendix: Table 21). Much of 
the commissioners work consisted in reversing what had happened in 1912 and thereby 
restoring what had happened in 1906, but now it was done without stating reasons. As in 
1906 the area benefited from the transfer in of electors equal to a third of a quota.  
Bundaberg and district came back to Capricornia from Wide Bay, and Capricornia 
returned to Kennedy its western parts around Clermont. Herbert, well over quota, 
transferred the Atherton Tableland to Kennedy and still remained above quota. Kennedy 
also received electors from Maranoa which was more than compensated by two adjacent 
pieces of Darling Downs. The redistribution, the commissioners noted, allowed 57 of the 
72 State electoral districts to be used as federal sub-divisions.94   
 
In the Senate there was a complaint that: 
 
The distribution will make it almost impossible for Labour, as we have known it 
in the past to secure that representation which it is entitled to, and which it 
formerly enjoyed.95 
 
But in both chambers approval was granted without divisions being required. At the 
previous general election (December 1919) Labor had won only three seats of the States 
ten with 46.8 per cent of the House vote; at the subsequent (December 1922) election it 
won only two with 41.4 per cent, retaining Capricornia and Kennedy but losing Maranoa 
where the Labor vote was down 7 percentage points.  As that figure was not much over 
the statewide decline of 5 points and the defeat followed the death in office of James 
Page, an archetypal outback Labor MP96 who had held the seat since 1901, it would be 
difficult to claim boundary changes in 1922 caused the loss. 
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The 1931 redistribution 
As previously noted, the 1931 census had been postponed. Once again there were ten 
divisions allocated to Queensland, the quota had risen substantially to 47 964 and the 
permissible minimum to 38 372. The difference between the two coastal big divisions 
which were above quota, and the two inland which were now below permissible 
minimum, well below in Kennedys case, had widened. The solution was partly to 
reverse what had been done in 1922, and more substantially to try again to take Kennedy 
through to the coast where the electors were thicker on the ground (see Appendix: Table 
22).97 Capricornia should send a smaller number (only a quarter of a quota) in Bundaberg 
and district back to Wide Bay, and regain electors in the west from Maranoa and 
Kennedy. Maranoa should open a new line of cross-area boundary transactions with 
Wide Bay in the Burnett district, and thereby keep net movement in and out of the area to 
a minimum. The main action should involve Kennedy and Herbert. Kennedy would 
receive stretches of the coast north and south of Townsville and give up the Atherton 
Tableland. But, as happened with the New South Wales report, these proposals lapsed in 
the tumultuous last days of the Scullin government. 
 
 
The 1934 redistribution 
In 1934, despite the country being in the depths of the Great Depression, the quota had 
risen slightly to 51 447 and the permissible minimum to 41 158, but the spread of the four 
divisions within the area was much the same as in 1931. The commissioners were more 
restrained with two of the divisions (see Appendix: Table 23). Capricornia should give up 
even less from the Bundaberg district, just 4000 electors, and gain nothing. Maranoa 
should lose nothing, gain a bit less from Wide Bay, and pick up a bit from Darling 
Downs. As to the continuing Herbert-Kennedy problem, Herbert would retain its 
southern, sugar-growing area but its northern boundary would stop at Innisfail, whilst 
Cairns and the Cape York peninsula would be transferred to Kennedy which would retain 
the Atherton Tableland.   
 
The proposals were nodded through in July 1934, and incidentally pointed the way for 
future solutions once the membership of the House had been enlarged. Thus Littleton 
Groom regretted that Pittsworth had left his division, Darling Downs, and thought it 
could be remedied at the next redistribution.98 
 
 
Queensland 1948-83 
Between 1934 and 1948 Queenslands enrolment grew from just over 0.5 million to 0.67 
million. With 18 members to be elected rather instead of the previous 10 the quota was 
reduced to 37 197 and the permissible minimum to 29 758, figures that fell between those 
which had applied at the 1912 and the 1922 redistributions. Had the redistribution been 
conducted prior to the 1946 general election based on enrolments at that time, the 
permissible minimum would have been 52 826 and the quota 66 032, and all four 
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divisions would still have fallen between those numbers. But with the enlargement of the 
House of Representatives, it was now possible for the commissioners to create six 
divisions rather than four and be able to send surpluses almost equal to a quota off to four 
adjacent south-eastern divisions, both the old divisions with which the original four had 
exchanged electors in the past, Wide Bay and Darling Downs, and the new divisions, 
Fisher and McPherson, as well. Enlargement of the House can matter a lot, but it may not 
alter long established patterns. Whether it does either, may depend on which State is 
involved. Queenslands experience was very different from that of New South Wales.   
 
 
The 1948 redistribution 
Reading southwards along the big divisions area boundary from its northern end, all 
adjacent divisions received electors, Wide Bay from Capricornia and Maranoa, Fisher 
from Maranoa, Darling Downs from Maranoa, and McPherson from Maranoa (see 
Appendix: Table 24). The two new divisions within the area joining the original four 
were Dawson, made up of 13 000 electors from Capricornia and 21 500 from Herbert, 
and Leichhardt (the commissioners had suggested it be called Dalrymple), receiving  
29 000 from Kennedy and 7500 from Herbert. Three of the original four divisions 
received no new electors, and contained only their old electors.   
 
Kennedy, not surprisingly because it lay in the middle, was the key. To help compensate 
for its massive contribution to the new division of Leichhardt, which would comprise 
Cairns, the Atherton Tableland, Cape York peninsula and the Gulf of Carpentaria coast, 
Kennedy got bits and pieces from its old neighbours: 2500 from Capricornia, 4500 from 
Herbert, and 3000 from Maranoa. In consequence Kennedy both moved southwards  
Maranoa no longer bordered on the Northern Territory, only on South Australia. Kennedy 
also finally reached the Pacific Ocean at Bowen  it was said at the time and for a while 
afterwards because the sitting Member was Minister for the Navy. 
 
It was inevitable that the enlargement of the House would be criticized, but a South 
Australian Liberal, P.A. McBride, joined the Queensland debate to argue that the Chifley 
Governments prior intentions might have been frustrated: 
 
 [A]t the critical moment when the Government saw nothing but disaster ahead 
it decided to increase the numbers of members of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives for no other purpose than to make safe seats for Labour. That 
plan has already caused great disappointment in the ranks of my friends opposite. 
They have talked about jerry-mandering [sic] by the Electoral Commissioners that 
they have themselves appointed.99 
 
In the event, at the September 1946 election Labor had won five of  ten Queensland seats 
with 43.0 per cent of the House vote; at the December 1949 election it could manage only 
three out of 18 with 39.5 per cent of the vote. Herbert, where preferences had to be 
distributed, and Kennedy were two of the three it retained.   
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Once the report had been tabled there was little discussion except of divisional names. 
Two new divisions in the metropolitan area had been named Bowman and Ryan after 
Labor stalwarts from the partys early days.  Among the large new divisions the 
commissioners choice of Dalrymple was altered to Leichhardt, but when a Liberal 
front-bencher, Josiah Francis, attempted to rename Dawson as Leichhardt and call the 
other new division Macrossan the proposal failed on the voices. 
 
 
The 1955 redistribution 
The 1955 redistribution retained the same number of divisions, but  unlike the usual 
pattern in New South Wales  enrolment in the extra-metropolitan divisions had grown 
slightly faster than in the metropolitan. The quota was 41 309 and the permissible 
minimum 33 048. Kennedy was slightly below that minimum and Herbert and Leichhardt 
slightly below quota. Four divisions, Herbert, Kennedy, Leichhardt and Maranoa, were 
effectively left alone apart from for minor adjustments (see Appendix: Table 25). But 
south of Townsville substantial changes were made to the two remaining divisions and 
there was some rethinking of 1948 decisions. Dawson transferred 12 000 electors from 
the northern suburbs of Rockhampton and further north to Capricornia where they 
indisputably belonged. But, more controversially, it then expanded further west with 
7000 from Capricornia, and swung southwards around Capricornia to reach the Pacific 
Ocean again just north of Bundaberg, thereby picking up another 3500 from Wide Bay. 
The resulting shape of the division inevitably attracted criticism. Overall the big 
divisions area enrolments varied from Kennedys just above the permissible minimum to 
Herberts still below quota. 
 
When adoption was moved on 31 May 1955 the Member for Herbert still grumbled about 
several matters. There had been a story that the Prime Minister had told Queensland 
Liberal MPs that they would have to accept the decisions of the commissioners and a 
report in the Brisbane morning paper claimed that there would be changes before the final 
report. He hinted that a petition presented by the flamboyant Mayor of Rockhampton had 
influenced decisions for Capricornia, and that the senior Liberal Minister from 
Queensland, Alan Hulme, had done well from late changes. Hulme denied allegations of 
improper influence, raised a very rare (by US standards) complaint about the shape of a 
division  Dawson was 400 miles long and 15 miles wide at its narrowest, and then 
anticipated future developments in the process: 
 
I believe that the provisions of the existing act are outmoded. There is 
inconsistency in relation to the evidence which commissioners take in the various 
states. In Queensland, the commissioners did not hear evidence from anyone.  In 
another State, the commissioners asked the political parties whether they had any 
views on the redistribution of electoral boundaries. That is an unfortunate 
inconsistency. Not only should evidence be taken by the commissioners, but 
opportunity should be given for discussion with them as well.100 
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Members of political parties should be able not merely to present evidence but to hold 
discussions with commissioners before the final proposals were presented. The report 
was accepted on the voices.  
 
 
The 1962 redistribution 
In 1962 Queensland was due to lose a division and this time the metropolitan divisions 
had grown slightly faster than the extra-metropolitan  even though the only two 
divisions to actually lose enrolment were the inner-city Brisbane and Griffith. The quota 
was 48 374 and the permissible minimum 38 099. The commissioners first chose Wide 
Bay to be abolished and then in response to a number of objections and some 
suggestions preferred Dawson (see Appendix: Table 26).101 As already mentioned, the 
abolition of Dawson had been one of the political considerations which led to all the 
proposed 1962 redistributions lapsing.   
 
The report left four divisions virtually untouched  Herbert, Kennedy, Leichhardt and 
Maranoa, the only exception being 100 electors to go from Kennedy to Capricornia to 
rectify a border problem, and concentrated on disposing of Dawsons 38 800 electors. 
The great majority, 27 000, would go to Capricornia and smaller packets move out of the 
area to Wide Bay and Fisher. Capricornia would pass only 10 000 on to Wide Bay and be 
left with a bloated enrolment of 56 500, well over quota and, for the first time in 60 years 
one of the big divisions  would be getting close to the permissible maximum then set at 
58 049.   
 
As both Fisher and Wide Bay totaled only 49 000 each at this point, they might appear to 
have been suitable recipients for some of Capricornias surplus, but Wide Bay was 
already bumping against the southern outskirts of Rockhampton and Fisher was no better 
placed to grow northwards. Community of interest would have been conspicuously 
violated in both divisions. The one occasion when Queensland faced the constantly 
recurring New South Wales problem of what to do when a big rural division has to be 
abolished confirms how unsatisfactory any solution is likely to be in such circumstances. 
Only half the 21 000 electors surplus to the six divisions needs could be exported easily. 
The other half either had to be left where they had first landed, in Capricornia, or else re-
directed to Maranoa. But Maranoa, though only slightly above permissible minimum, 
was huge in area and traditionally sensitive about the matter. It would need to shift most 
or all of an equivalent number of electors to either or both of its eastern neighbours. One 
possibility would have to be Darling Downs, which was thought to be a rural seat and 
was already well above quota at 53 000. The alternative, McPherson, was the fastest 
growing division in the state and, having grown by 15 000 since the previous 
redistribution, had just dumped more than 10 000 electors into Darling Downs. Kennedy, 
the only other possible destination if Maranoa was brought into play, had an equally 
strong plea of large area to ask to be left alone. 
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The 1968 redistribution 
By 1968 the threat of Queensland losing a seat was over, and as a consequence the quota 
had increased only slightly to 50 714 and the permissible minimum to 40 572. The 
divisions biggest in area, Kennedy and Maranoa, were both under permissible minimum, 
and only Herbert was over quota. The commissioners said nothing about metropolitan 
and extra-metropolitan growth rates, quite possibly because those figures would have 
been all over the place, and it appeared that any movements across the area boundary 
could be modest. On their first try the commissioners were unable to agree on its extent 
(see Appendix: Table 27). The majority wished to bring in only 15 per cent of a quota of 
electors from Wide Bay and McPherson into Kennedy and Maranoa respectively. The 
dissenting Commonwealth Electoral Officer, Ivan Weise, proposed 42 per cent of a quota 
come from McPherson, Darling Downs and Fisher, and all to go into Maranoa.102 
 
Two sets of proposals were produced, but without reasons being stated by the majority. 
The majoritys chain of transfers had the effect of reducing Dawsons inland component 
and increasing its coastal component, vice versa for Kennedy, thereby concentrating 
Dawson as a northern and coastal division. Weises dissent argued a number of points of 
which the most interesting for the purposes of this paper concerned Kennedy and 
Maranoa. In his opinion Kennedy had come too far into the south-east of the State, and 
both Kennedy (then 247 500 sq.km.) and Maranoa (194 565 sq.km.) extended from the 
States western boundary to within 140 miles of Brisbane. To deal with that problem he 
attempted to reconstruct Kennedy and Maranoa and give greater recognition of 
community of interest in each. The western part of Maranoa, containing 33.4 per cent of a 
quota, would be combined with the western part of Kennedy, containing 47.9 of a quota 
if a quota, in a new division tentatively called Vickers. The eastern part of Maranoa, 
with 45.6 per cent of a quota, would be combined with western bits of McPherson, 
Darling Downs and Fisher in a new division tentatively called Moonie. (These were the 
days of great hope for the oil industry in that vicinity.) The eastern part of Kennedy 
would be added to Dawson and pull it further west instead of it shifting east as the 
majority sought to do. 
 
When the report was put to the House Whitlam queried how a divided report could be 
dealt with and was assured that it was still a report in the names of the three 
commissioners. The Member for Dawson, Rex Patterson, who moved disapproval, said 
the ALP preferred Weises version, and engaged in some detailed criticism of the 
majoritys proposals. Gayndah which had been added to Kennedy really was not a 
pastoral area as the majority had stated, the inclusion of Carmila in Capricornia for the 
convenience of keeping to a sub-division boundary was not right, and whilst the south-
east corner of Kennedy was quite close to Brisbane the north-west part of Leichhardt was 
far from the capital, yet Kennedy had fewer electors than did Leichhardt. He also got in a 
dig at one commissioner being the head of the federal department headed by the senior 
                                                 
102 Report by the Distribution Commissioners appointed  for the purpose of redistricting the State of 
Queensland into Electoral Divisions, 1968, Canberra; Statement by Distribution Commissioner I.F. Weise 
showing reasons for dissent from the proposals relation to the Divisions of Capricornia, Darling Downs, 
Dawson. Fisher, Kennedy, Maranoa and Wide Bay, 1968, Canberra. 
  53
Liberal minister from Queensland.103 A Liberal MP, Dr Wylie Gibbs, joined in criticism 
of the commissioners by arguing that both Weise and the states Valuer-General had 
limited expertise for drawing electoral boundaries. He suggested that a different formula 
for selecting commissioners be adopted: a demographer, the Chief Electoral 
Commissioner (presumably the head of the Electoral Office) and a judge.104 Another 
Labor Member said the shape of Dawson resembled a hung sheep and called it a 
gerrymander, but the responsible Minister, Peter Nixon, defended the majoritys version 
with a mass of credible voting statistics.105 
 
The proposals were adopted by the House on a party vote, but in the Senate their progress 
became caught up in the question of an early dissolution, and were referred back to the 
commissioners on a 26-24 vote in which the Democratic Labor Partys senators 
supported the ALP.106 The majority repeated their proposals for five divisions and 
slightly increased the number of electors from the southern end of Dawson going to 
Capricornia (see Appendix: Table 28). Weise stated he still thought his proposals were 
necessary to conform to the requirements of the CEA.107 When that report came back to 
Parliament, it was accepted by the Senate on 21 November with the DLP now voting 
against the Labor motion to reject, and by the House on 26 November.108  
 
 
The 1975 redistribution 
In 1975, Wiese again in the chair with two new commissioners (one of whom was the 
present writer), and still 18 divisions to be drawn, a new redistribution began. The quota 
was 64 865 and the permissible minimum, now fixed at a ±10 per cent deviation from 
quota, 58 379. Three divisions were below the permissible minimum  Capricornia 
slightly and Kennedy and Maranoa substantially below  and the area contained only 5.2 
quotas. Either a division would have to be abolished, or a substantial number of electors 
would have to be added to the area, or all six divisions would have to be crammed close 
to the permissible minimum and the other 12 Queensland divisions pushed towards the 
permissible maximum with community of interest likely to suffer as a result. The 
commissioners chose to abolish a division, Kennedy, create a differently named division, 
provisionally called Flynn that incorporated almost all of Maranoa and the southern and 
western parts of Kennedy, and keep as small as possible movements across the area 
boundary from Darling Downs and Wide Bay (see Appendix: Table 29). The proposals 
produced a substantial number of objections, three-quarters of which were concerned 
with the proposed Flynn and the area and community of interest questions it raised.   
 
In response the commissioners altered the boundary between Flynn and Dawson with a 
net gain in electors and reduction in area for Flynn, and reversed the flow of electors 
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across the area border.109 The revised Flynn still came predominantly from Maranoa 
and absorbed almost all of its former electors, whilst the electors of Kennedy were 
divided in almost equal numbers to Flynn and Dawson. The only other division to be 
substantially affected was Dawson which would transfer coastal electors to Herbert and 
Capricornia, but gain a comparable number from the now defunct Kennedy, thereby 
ceasing to be a wholly coastal and sugar division and now having more of a mixed 
character than ever before. The larger part of the controversial southern extension of 
Kennedy into the Burnett region was now allocated to Wide Bay, pass out of the area and 
cease to be controversial. The range of big divisions enrolments was to be substantially 
compressed by previous standards, 63 305 for Capricornia at the bottom and 67 749 for 
Herbert, the only big division above quota, at the top. 
 
The Queensland proposals followed very much the same course as those for New South 
Wales already recounted. Daly moved adoption with a similar speech, in which he spoke 
of three outback divisions, a rare use of the term, and dealt with the argument current 
that nothing should be done because the 1976 census would give the state another seat. In 
his opinion it would have to be fitted into the rapidly growing area between Brisbane and 
the Gold Coast.110 The current senior Queensland Liberal for electoral matters, Eric 
Robinson, defended the old 20 per cent margin (over which the boundary proposals 
would soon fail) but said he might have settled for 15 per cent.111 When the Coalition 
returned to office the 10 per cent figure was retained, but with the 5000 sq.km. formula 
added. 
 
A Bill to implement the defeated report was brought in on 28 May, and the bills were 
debated the following day.  By then the content of the proposals had been well worked 
over, but two contributions should be mentioned. Another Queensland Liberal, Kevin 
Cairns, sensibly pointed out that in the debates on the first redistribution to be 
implemented in 1906 the commissioners had preferred equality to community of interest 
and there was nothing new in the current controversy, and  exceptionally for Australian 
parliamentary debates  an article was read into Hansard, a piece by Malcolm Mackerras 
in The Bulletin that denied gerrymandering had taken place.112 As with the equivalent 
New South Wales bill, the Senate proved obdurate.    
 
 
The 1977 redistribution 
All six big divisions dealt with in the 1977 redistribution qualified for the new 5000 
sq.km. benefit:  Kennedy (663 150 sq.km.), Maranoa (517 400 sq.km.) and Leichhardt 
(406 650 sq.km.) did so obviously, Dawson (67 850 sq.km.) and Capricornia (25 000 
sq.km.) comfortably, but Herbert (8400 sq.km.) only narrowly. The three divisions that 
bordered on the area had also qualified on the new criterion  Wide Bay (14 150 sq.km.), 
Darling Downs (8350 sq.km.) and Fisher (7150 sq.km.)  but each contained a substantial 
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urban population. If that were to be defined by having sub-divisions containing close to 
10,000 electors or more, the urban proportions of total enrolment in the three were: Wide 
Bay  57.8 per cent in Bundaberg, Gympie and Maryborough; Darling Downs 65.7 per 
cent in Toowoomba, and Fisher 60.8 per cent in Landsborough (effectively Caloundra), 
Nambour and Caboolture.  Despite sharing in the benefit, they were different, 
 
However the average enrolments for the three classes of division suggest relatively little 
use was made of the amendment: the six big divisions averaged 63 939, the three middle 
divisions 65 433, and the ten remaining divisions (effectively Brisbane, Ipswich and the 
Gold Coast) 66 872. Statistics for the existing divisions areas with which the 
redistribution started were not given, but as the portions transferred were relatively 
compact the changes made by the redistribution would not have mattered very much.   
 
Queensland had acquired an additional seat, and with a quota of 65 877 and a permissible 
minimum of 59 290 there were now only 5.4 quotas in the area.113 Maranoa and Kennedy 
were both well under the permissible minimum, Capricornia barely over it, and the easy 
solution was to top those three from outside the area and make minimal changes to the 
other three or leave them alone (see Appendix: Table 30). Capricornia received a modest 
number from Wide Bay, Kennedy rather more from Wide Bay, and Maranoa, which had 
been the worst off, a more substantial number still from Darling Downs, Fisher and Wide 
Bay. With a new government in control of the Senate the report was nodded through. 
 
Two enduring points about Queensland redistributions might be made at this point. First, 
Maranoa, always prone to relative decline in enrolments, starts at the Northern Territory 
border and runs eastwards along the NSW border until it includes whatever is thought to 
be its appropriate enrolment at that redistribution. Eventually it approaches Toowoomba, 
traditionally the center of the Darling Downs socio-economic region and too large a 
packet of electors to be included with anything more than a modest hinterland. 
Consequently when the numbers require more territory be acquired on Maranoas eastern 
edge, the division has either to flow to the north of Toowoomba and eventually into the 
Burnett district, or to the south of Toowoomba and into the Granite Belt, or sometimes do 
both simultaneously. This was the occasion for a massive thrust to the north of 
Toowomba.   
 
Second, an earlier paragraph showed Wide Bay being depleted to assist the three larger 
divisions (Maranoa, Kennedy and Capricornia) to its west, north-west and north. After 
that process its enrolment had been reduced to the point Maranoa had been at when the 
redistribution began, and consequently Wide Bay was in need of relief on a similar scale. 
This could only be achieved by a chain process such as occurred regularly in 
redistributions of the New South Wales big divisions area but not Queenslands. To 
enable the transfer into the Queensland area several divisions as far off as Brisbane had to 
be involved as well. Ryan, the far end of the chain, did a swap with the division of 
Brisbane, and received electors from Moreton and Oxley, after which it was able to 
transfer some to Griffith and 10 500 northwards to Petrie. Petrie, which had started over 
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quota, could then pass 15 500 to Fisher, whence 17 500 went to Wide Bay, bringing that 
division on the area border back to acceptability. It was a chain that snowballed rather 
than diminished as it moved north. 
 
 
Queensland 1984-2006 
 
The 1984 redistribution 
Another enlargement of the House, but proportionately smaller than that which had taken 
place in 1948, brought the quota down only slightly to 62 618 and the permissible 
minimum to 56 356. Vigorous population growth through most of Queensland left only 
one of the six existing big divisions, Kennedy, below the permissible maximum of 68 880 
and their area as a whole with 7.1 quotas. The redistribution committee members, who 
included the present writer, could have created another division within the area, but chose 
instead to export a quota of electors to divisions in the south-eastern corner (see 
Appendix: Table 31). The most substantial contribution would go from Capricornia to the 
new division of Hinkler and thereby give it two provincial cities, Gladstone and 
Bundaberg, plus the rural territory between Bundaberg and Rockhampton which had 
gone back and forth between Capricornia and Wide Bay from the earliest redistributions. 
Smaller numbers from Kennedy and Maranoa would go to Wide Bay which would 
supply the balance it needed to Hinkler. Finally along the area boundary, Maranoa gave 
smaller numbers of electors to Fisher and (net) to Darling Downs. 
 
Within the area Capricornia would be brought back to quota mainly by electors from 
Dawson, and Leichhardt, which was now challenging Herbert for the title of fastest 
growing big division, received smaller numbers from Herbert and transferred the 
Atherton Tableland and part of the Gulf of Carpentaria coast to Kennedy. Maranoa lost a 
quarter of a quota to divisions along its eastern border, and collected almost as many 
from Kennedy around Longreach. Kennedy was consequently been pulled northwards as 
it was being trimmed on its always controversial south-eastern flank.   
 
The committees reasons particularly relevant to this paper are both general and 
particular. The general point was that the lower quota now meant that the States larger 
provincial cities, including three within the area, Cairns, Townsville and Rockhampton, 
and one just outside it, Toowoomba, were on the verge of making a quota by themselves 
and needed very small hinterlands. 
 
[W]hereas it was often possible in the past to define the hinterlands of those cities 
with some precision and attach them to the appropriate city, in the present 
redistribution this has not always been possible. The Redistribution Committee 
considered that it is undesirable to split any city or town between two Divisions, 
and noted that in previous redistributions nothing caused greater dissatisfaction 
with proposals. However an inevitable consequence of preserving each provincial 
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city intact is that less satisfactory decisions have to be taken for the areas between 
the cities.114 
 
As for the biggest divisions: 
 
The Committee was also very much aware that three existing Divisions, 
Leichhardt, Kennedy and Maranoa, are already among the largest in the 
Commonwealth and that any increase in their area should be brought about only 
as a last resort. Unfortunately each of those Divisions comprises a mix of 
Subdivisions, some with huge areas and relatively small enrolments and others 
closer to the coast whose areas are smaller and enrolments more substantial.  
Adjustments in one sort of area have apparently disproportionate consequences in 
the other sort, and in the western areas of all three Divisions, apart from Mt Isa, 
transfers of relatively small numbers of electors inevitably entail the movement of 
very large areas.115 
 
The augmented commission conducted four inquiries relevant to the big divisions, and 
made three minor changes as a result. The most significant moved the boundary between 
Leichhardt and Kennedy southwards to maintain the community of interest of the 
Aboriginal community of Kowanyama with its affines to the north. But a suggestion to 
vary another stretch of that boundary was rejected on the ground that to have allowed it 
would have ensured that at the next redistribution the southern boundary of Leichhardt 
would have to move into the suburbs of Cairns.116 Kennedy extended to the Pacific 
Ocean once more, albeit on a narrow front, and as a consequence rapidly-growing 
Leichhardt was cut off from the rest of the State into which it could be expected to send 
surplus electors. Thus each end of the Kennedy-Leichhardt boundary was solidly pegged 
in place by different manifestations of community of interest. 
 
 
The 1992 redistribution 
The 1984 redistribution survived though the first complete three-elections cycle. When 
the process began again in 1992, Queensland had gained a seat, but the quota had still 
risen to 72,526 and the permissible minimum to 65,274. With only 6.1 quotas in the area, 
and the need to put all six divisions slightly above quota because of accelerating 
enrolment growth in the south-east corner of the State, the redistribution committee could 
keep transfers across the area border to a minimum (see Appendix: Table 32). Warwick 
and the district between Warwick and Toowoomba (14.2 per cent of a quota) moved from 
extra-metropolitan Rankin into Maranoa together with a small number from Darling 
Downs, thereby allowing the Blackwater-Emerald area (14.1 per cent of a quota) 
concerned primarily with coal-mining to move from Maranoa into Capricornia.117 
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The Labor Party objected to what had happened at the point where the boundaries of 
Kennedy, Maranoa and Capricornia met, and the augmented commission made modest 
changes to keep particular shires undivided and retain existing divisional boundaries as 
much as possible.118 Overall, the division most impacted by the redistribution, 
Leichhardt, which had provided 9000 electors net to Kennedy and increased its coastal 
component, still retained 85.5 per cent of its electors. 
 
 
The 1994 redistribution 
At this point the three-elections cycle starts to fall apart for Queensland. There had to be 
another redistribution in 1994 because the State had secured another seat, bringing the 
total up to 26. The quota was up to 76 697, the permissible minimum to 69 028, and the 
area now held 6.3 quotas. After a tidying-up operation, five of the six divisions were 
started over quota, which in Kennedys case was approaching the permissible maximum 
(see Appendix: Table 33).  Herbert, the only division not to keep all its electors, gave a 
few to Kennedy and to Dawson, and the total effect of the redistribution was minimal.119 
 
 
The 1997 redistribution 
The 1997 redistribution followed a similar pattern. Again there was an additional seat for 
the State, and with the quota at 78 121 and the permissible minimum at 70 309 the 
number of quotas in the area was up slightly to 6.4. All six divisions were above quota 
and Dawson was above the permissible maximum. The redistribution committee noted 
input complaining that redistributions were too frequent and communities were being 
disrupted as a consequence and, statewide at least, sought to reduce the number of 
electors being moved out of their current divisions (see Appendix: Table 34).120 However 
surplus electors were passed out of the area, from Capricornia to Hinkler and Wide Bay 
and from Maranoa to Groom. 
 
Within the big divisions area there were still a few controversies. When it was proposed 
that 7500 electors, some south of Cairns and some on the western side of the Atherton 
Tableland, be moved from Leichhardt where they were surplus to requirement into 
Kennedy where they were needed, there were objections. More were subsequently taken 
from south of Cairns and far fewer from the western edge of Leichhardt, but the total 
number, 7200, was barely changed.121 A number of objections sought to preserve the 
status quo on that boundary but, as the augmented commission said, subsequent research 
revealed that any changes to the proposal produced outcomes which resulted in changes 
of equal or greater scale and, more generally, a change in the number of seats was likely 
to have had an extensive impact.  
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The 2003 redistribution 
The 1997 redistribution managed to survive for two general elections, but in 2003 the 
addition of another seat for the State began the process again. The quota was up 
substantially to 84 078 and the permissible minimum to 75 671. All divisions were well 
clear of the minimum, three were above quota and three below, and Herbert was again 
not far from permissible maximum. The area contained 6.1 quotas so movements across 
the area boundary could be minimal (see Appendix: Table 35). Capricornia reclaimed 
some electors from Hinkler and more from Wide Bay. 
 
Within the area, Maranoa was just below quota and had relatively low growth prospects. 
The redistribution committee proposed a swap with Capricornia that would give five 
western shires to Maranoa in exchange for one to the east for a net gain of 3400 electors. 
There were objections but the decision was upheld. Similarly the need to reduce Herbert 
and top up Kennedy brought the latter division into the outskirts of Townsville to secure 
7200 electors, and no alternative could be found.122 
 
 
The 2006 Queensland redistribution 
Unlike New South Wales problems in 2006 which were exacerbated by losing a seat, 
Queenslands equivalent problems stemmed from receiving yet another additional seat. 
Again, despite that gain, the quota rose to 85 220, and the permissible minimum and 
maximum became 76 698 and 93 742 respectively. All six divisions in the big divisions 
area were above quota, with Dawson the highest and only 2000 short of the permissible 
maximum. Overall the area contained 6.3 quotas. At long last a redistribution committee 
chose to add a seat to the area, and that required reversing recent exports of electors and 
restoring the areas boundary with the south-eastern divisions roughly to what it had been 
prior to 1984  but now with seven divisions to the north and west of that boundary 
instead of six (see Appendix: Table 36). It would be difficult to point to any immediate 
consequences of the shift, but the 1998 amendment to the CEA was used to bring forward 
the projected enrolment date from four years on to just two years on.   
 
The redistribution committee suggested that the new division should be called Wright 
but the augmented commission changed the name to Flynn for good reasons.123 In the 
final report the augmented commission recorded that there appeared to have been an 
attention shift from growth in the south-east corner of the State, which had influenced the 
2003 redistributions location of its new seat in that part of the State, to anticipated 
growth in major coastal cities from the Sunshine Coast to Cairns. Though none of the 
major political parties had suggested a division like Flynn, its existence was generally 
accepted once the redistribution committee had proposed it and the objections lodged 
focused rather on particular elements in the composition of some divisions with Flynn 
getting most attention.   
 
The objections were directed especially to the inclusion in the western end of Flynn of 
eight shires where grazing was still dominant when mining had taken over most of the 
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division. These shires would have preferred to be in Maranoa and denied they had any 
connection with Gladstone, the divisions principal city located at the opposite end of the 
division. The augmented commission, which had held a meeting attended by seven of the 
eight Mayors involved at Longreach in the middle of the discontented shires, recognised 
their claims as weighty and looked for an alternative. 
 
But, ultimately, its endeavours were in vain: the inexorable imperative of numbers 
stood in the way. Every compensatory adjustment that was suggested either failed 
the test of the numbers or would, had it been adopted, have caused even greater 
problems, affecting a number of other divisions across the State, under the criteria 
set by the legislation.124 
 
Adding the shires to Maranoa would exacerbate that divisions problems with size and 
the number of separate communities that had to be looked after, whereas the future 
development of Gladstone might create new links and some links already existed between 
the western eight shires and the substantial town of Emerald which was also in the new 
division and closer to them. 
  
Flynn received the lions share of electors brought into the area to create its seventh 
division; the largest parcel coming from a division outside the area, Hinkler. That transfer 
provided Flynn with the obligatory substantial urban centre in Gladstone together with 
the stretch of coast that usually went with urban centres in Queensland, but it also 
repeated Kennedys controversial thrust south-eastwards to some extent by moving into 
the Burnett once again when, in a minor part of settling Flynns boundaries, additional 
electors were added from Wide Bay. On the map the division ran mainly through more 
thinly-populated territory west along the central railway line; the augmented commission 
preferred to speak of the highways involved. Hinklers remaining urban centre, 
Bundaberg, now looked south once more as there had been a large transfer from Wide 
Bay including the growing coastal city of Hervey Bay. Wide Bays loss in turn set off a 
chain-reaction that extended southwards into the Sunshine Coast and produced partisan 
grievances at the points where National Party and Liberal Party seats, rather like tectonic 
plates, slid over one another. It may well have been the series of such changes, 
consequential on the creation of Flynn, which made the new division as controversial as 
it was  though the dissatisfaction of the western shires fitted best into traditional 
categories of complaint.   
 
A second lot of transactions across the area boundary restored Maranoa to quota after it 
had contributed substantially to Flynn. Blair, a relatively new division in the south-east, 
had been assembled in the 1997 redistribution from surplus parts of four peri-
metropolitan divisions that were being pushed north and west by expansion of the 
metropolitan area, now contributed to Maranoa. The transfer into Blair at the time of its 
creation of 20 000 electors from the division of Oxley had been especially controversial 
because of the supposed adverse effect on Pauline Hansons chances of winning a seat in 
the House of Representatives. Despite leading on first preferences at the 1998 election, 
she was defeated on preferences in Blair. In an associated tidying-up operation that 
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happened to involve the area boundary, some electors from Groom were added to 
Maranoa. 
 
Within the area itself there was one largeish (but falling well short of substantial with 
enrolment total numbers now so high) secondary transfer involved in getting Flynn up to 
quota, and a pair of minor instances that sought to rectify earlier less-than-ideal decisions. 
In the first category, Capricornia gave electors from west of Rockhampton to Flynn, and 
was compensated from Dawson south of Mackay. Dawson in turn got a smaller number 
from Herbert. In the second category, Leichhardt transferred electors to Kennedy from 
the outskirts of Cairns, and Kennedy passed rather more to Herbert from the outskirts of 
Townsville. A recurring problem, which has usually proved insoluble, involves one 
division creeping too close to the principal urban centre of a neighbour, an unwelcome 
outcome mentioned previously in the context of the 1984 redistribution. The areas high 
retention rate, together with the fact that only one division, Maranoa (with a 76.3 per cent 
retention rate), came close to being substantially altered, confirms that the intention to 
minimize movements of electors was achieved. 
 
 
Conclusions 
Can any lessons be drawn from the evidence, briefly sampled here, that covers two States 
 which contain half the Commonwealths population  and a century of independent 
officers attempts to apply principles laid down for them by the legislature? 
 
The first, trite, conclusion must be that geography matters. Queensland is the simpler of 
the two cases. That part of the State where the four, then six, now seven, big divisions are 
to be found is and has been dominated by a string of major coastal cities  Cairns, 
Townsville, Mackay, Rockhampton and, more recently, Gladstone  but there have 
always been two divisions, Kennedy and Maranoa, which were different. Since the 
decline of Charters Towers early in the 20th century there has been only one major inland 
city in the State, Toowoomba, and that is close to Brisbane and located in a compact, 
tightly knit division  originally called Darling Downs after the district, later Groom  
outside the area with which we are concerned. Kennedy has always contained both 
Charters Towers and Mt Isa which soon supplanted it with consequent tensions as to 
where the Electoral Offices divisional office should be located. But at the 1912 
redistribution (the first using sub-division figures) those two towns contained only 39 per 
cent of the divisional enrolment. By 1948 the proportion was down to 25 per cent and by 
1984 up again but only to 30 per cent.  Maranoa has been even less well provided with a 
major urban centre. Until very recently its biggest, Dalby, accounted for only 18 per cent 
(1912), 19 per cent (1948) and 15 per cent (1984) of Maranoas enrolment. Once away 
from the coast Queenslands urban centres are small and distant from each other when 
compared with inland New South Wales. A great many square kilometres have to be 
moved to round up a few thousand electors, as successive redistribution commissioners 
have complained.   
 
Beyond the natural periphery of the area of big divisions lie two smaller cities whose 
main links might have been thought to lie in the opposite direction, but still could be 
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pushed into the area to make up the numbers. Bundaberg was twice incorporated in 
Capricornia, in 1906-12 and 1922-48, but is now separated from Capricornia by Hinkler. 
Warwick was added to Maranoa in 1992 and by the 2006 redistribution provided 22 per 
cent of its enrolment, but it is located too far from the main west-east axis of Maranoa 
that passes through Dalby and ends in Toowomba to perform the usual functions of a 
divisions urban centre. Its smaller neighbour, Stanthorpe, had already joined Maranoa in 
1969. Between Warwick and Bundaberg lies a curve of relatively closely-settled shires 
with one or more medium size towns which have been disassembled and moved about 
regularly as the numbers required despite their complaints. 
 
Traditionally inland Queensland was dominated by mining and grazing, with grazing 
divisible between sheep and cattle if a distinction was required, but the work forces 
required by each of these industries have been relatively small and declined steadily 
through the 20th century. Agriculture was confined mainly to the coast and along the 
boundary between the big divisions area and the rest, but with a few pockets like the 
Atherton Tableland and the Central Highlands further inland. The recent multiplication of 
towns in what is now the coal-mining inland has gone some way to stopping or even 
reversing the downward trend of the inland population, but the work force in open-cut 
mining is relatively small, and the new communities coal has created tend to be linked to 
particular coastal cities, first as their ports and then as their residential bases, rather than 
pick one of their number which is centrally located to become dominant. One plausible 
candidate for such a promotion, Emerald, started in Capricornia, went to Maranoa 1906-
12, back to Capricornia 1912-1948, to Kennedy 1948-84, back to Maranoa 1984-2006, 
and now is in Flynn, which says something about the long-term instability of boundaries 
away from the coast. Longreach, which is further west on the central railway line and 
should have less mobile, started in Maranoa but was transferred to Kennedy in 1912 and 
stayed there  albeit always close to the southern boundary of the division  until 
transferred to Capricornia in 1997 and back to Maranoa in 2003. Some inland towns 
move more often than others. 
 
The attractions of living on the coast dominated Australian demographic trends in the 
period reviewed here, and have kept those of Queenslands big divisions which run along 
the coast in step with the State as a whole, and sometimes a step ahead. They did not 
work for Kennedy and Maranoa, and consequently most Queensland redistributions have 
begun with two inter-related problems, how to get those two divisions up to an acceptable 
level and, second, what to do to fix the other, usually minor, problems that follow from 
the first activity or else could result from minor variations in enrolment growth in the 
other two or (after 1949) four divisions of the area. 
 
Our other case, New South Wales, has been more complicated. There all the big divisions 
have always lacked the attractions of coastal living, and consequently have experienced a 
steady decline in population and enrolment relative to the whole State which in turn has 
slipped slightly in the national cut-up of seats. Since 1948 the NSW share of the national 
pool of seats has fallen by 6 percentage points whilst Queenslands has risen by more 
than 4 points.  Only once (1962) has Queensland faced the anguish of a redistribution that 
followed the loss of a seat, and that trauma was ended when the redistribution was 
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abandoned. New South Wales had it actually happen five times, 1955, 1968, 1977 (when 
two seats were lost), 1992 and 2006, as well as being anticipated in the lapsed 
redistribution of 1962. Inland New South Wales has been likely to experience regularly 
the double jeopardy of a need to abolish a seat somewhere in the State and the evidence 
of its relative decline in enrolments pointing to where that can be done. 
 
Moreover, it is probably easier (which may mean less controversial) to redraw a 
smaller number of boundaries than a larger number just as, to adapt Sir Henry Parkes 
excellent metaphor for the redistribution process, it is easier to build a house of cards 
with a few cards rather than having to use the whole deck. In this paper three categories 
of boundary have been mentioned. One is the boundaries between States and they 
constrain redistribution possibilities because they cannot be crossed. Another is the 
boundaries which each division shares with a contiguous neighbour. The more such 
neighbours a division has, the more options there will be for moving electors in or out to 
resolve the divisions own and wider problems. Finally there is a notional boundary 
between a group of divisions which may have a case for special consideration and the rest 
of their State. Such a boundary defining the big divisions area has figured so 
prominently in the preceding discussion.  
 
The second and third categories can be examined in the light of statistics that count and 
calculate the averages of the number of boundaries each division has with other divisions, 
both within the big divisions area and across the area border, at each effective i.e. 
implemented redistribution of which there have been 13 for New South Wales and 15 for 
Queensland. Usually for New South Wales the typical big division has had between two 
and three contiguous neighbors within the big divisions area. Averages greater than three 
were uncommon and arose from a particular redistribution when the pool was enlarged 
and the subsequent one when change was minimal  3.3 and 3.4 in 1948 and 1955.   
 
Potentially of greater interest because it raises the question whether the electors of the big 
divisions warrant special consideration, there were rather fewer contiguous divisions 
across the area boundary. All the instances prior to 1977 were below 2.0 and went down 
to just over 1.0 a couple of times (1955 and 1948). Thus those inter-divisional boundaries 
may have had a special significance but there were fewer of them as well, and so they 
were less available as well as undesirable.  
 
The area boundary crossing averages are distorted by two divisions, Macquarie and New 
England. They account for at least half the shared boundaries at every redistribution, and 
deserve attention as further illustrations of the extent to which the redistribution 
experience of particular divisions can vary.  To start with, their respective retention rate 
averages are very different and retention rates are always a matter of concern to 
redistribution commissioners and electors alike, high rates are good and low rates are 
bad. In 2006 Macquarie was drastically altered and New England remained unchanged, 
but over the seven redistributions prior to 1984 there was little difference between them, 
Macquaries average retention rate was 82.8 per cent and New Englands 87.9. However, 
in the four redistributions 1984-99 they appear to be very different, as Macquaries 
average retention rate is 66.3 per cent and New Englands is 98.3 per cent. Macquaries 
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boundaries were drastically redrawn twice (1984 and 2006) but New Englands were 
never subject to more than minor tinkering. Reverting to the equation of substantial 
with a cut-off set at 75 per cent, over the 13 redistributions Macquarie was hit hard four 
times (1948, 1977, 1984 and 2006) but New England only once (1948). A possible 
explanation, already mentioned, could be that the NSW big divisions area boundary is 
almost impervious from the Queensland border down to the Hunter Valley, then becomes 
permeable for some distance, and finally tightens up again once the Hume Highway has 
been crossed and resumes being almost impervious down to the Victorian border. More 
plausible might be that Macquarie is too close to the demographic explosion of the 
western suburbs of Sydney, and is frequently put in play to solve problems generated 
outside the big divisions area. 
 
The small number of Queenslands big divisions, and the limited length of the area 
boundary dividing them from the rest of the State, produces very different outcomes. The 
average score for boundaries within the area varied little  as did the total number of 
divisions within the area  with 2.7 seven times and 2.5 five times out of a possible 15 
redistributions. Only once did the average rise to 2.8 and that was 2006 when a seventh 
division was added to the area. Divisions paired along the area boundary were almost 
always the same two, Capricornia with Wide Bay and Maranoa with Darling Downs.  
The exceptional cases when some other division touched the area boundary, Dawson 
(1955) and Kennedy (1969, 1977), were much criticised as unnatural extensions of an 
inland division or a northern division. After 1948 there were additional divisions 
across the boundary to exchange electors with, usually involving Maranoa, but very 
recently the number of divisions on the south-eastern side of the area boundary may have 
begun to contract again. New South Wales traditionally has had more problems with area 
border crossing than Queensland because it had more places where such problems were 
likely to occur.      
 
A second tentative conclusion, also likely to be trite but given past neglect of the topic 
still worth making, is that a major alteration in a States number of divisions to be 
redistributed may be more disruptive than the addition or subtraction of a single division 
to or from the pool, and the latter may to be more disruptive than when there is no change 
at all in the size of the pool. Table 37, derived from final reports only, offers some 
evidence. For both States, the two redistributions when the House was enlarged (1948, 
1984) have conspicuously lower retention rates than the substantial number of 
redistributions when the number of divisions in the State remained unchanged, and the 
consequences are much the same for both States. But in the redistributions when there 
was only slight change, usually one division more or less, the picture is more 
complicated.   
 
In the first place, New South Wales usually has a loss and Queensland usually has a gain. 
Second, in New South Wales the big divisions area consistently declines against the 
State as a whole, whilst in Queensland it holds its own. Thus accommodating a change is 
more likely to be pushed into the area in New South Wales, but could end up anywhere in 
Queensland. The result is that Queenslands retention rate is much higher  except for the 
one instance when there was a statewide decline and an area division was to be sacrificed. 
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The proposal that Dawson be sacrificed, it will be remembered, was half the explanation 
for the Coalition parties disagreeing on whether to accept the 1962 redistribution. In 
practice to fire a round of trenchant criticism at how the redistribution process has been 
worked on any occasion, only one suspect division is needed. Similarly participants in the 
consultative process will suggest the means to remove that divisions defects without 
examining the inevitable flow-on to adjacent divisions.  
 
Table 37 
Change in statewide pool of divisions (n = number of redistributions)  
and big divisions area retention rate (% = average) 
 
  NSW  Qld 
 n % n % 
No change 5 86.7 7 87.3 
Change -1 5 78.9 1 84.3 
-2 1 72.6 0 n.a. 
+1 2 73.8 7 92.5 
Large 2 63.2 2 62.8 
 
Moving to the experience of individual divisions, when an arbitrary quantity, less than 75 
per cent of electors remaining in their previous division, is used to suggest a qualitative 
change by labeling substantial impacts and pointing to stressed divisions, it should be 
borne in mind that there may be narrow misses. For example, the big divisions area of 
New South Wales had figures just above that line in 1962 and 1992 and Queenslands 
area-wide retention rate was just below that line once. Individual divisional figures may 
miss narrowly as well.  In New South Wales the two House enlargement redistributions 
account for a disproportionate number of cases of stress, both area-wide  in 1948 (65.9 
per cent) and 1984 (60.5 per cent), and for individual divisions  ten cases out of a total 
of 26. But some divisions are more likely to be stressed than others.  Canobolas/Calare 
is the prize example with five instances (1906, 1912, 1962, 1968, 1977) in addition to the 
enlargement redistributions of 1948 and 1984, and it is possible that being in the middle 
of the area increases risk. Another middle division, the short-lived Lawson, fell below 
that line only once. Putting aside the enlargement redistributions, three peripheral NSW 
divisions went below the line twice, and another three once. Farrer is the only exception, 
but having been created in 1948 it was caught in the general melee of 1984.   
 
The more divisions there are, the more neighbors they are likely to have, and the more 
likely it is that a large transfer can be required or that a number of smaller ones will 
accumulate. There has been one division in the two States, Leichhardt, which since its 
creation in 1949 has had at most only two neighbors and more usually only one, tucked 
away as it is in a far corner of the area, the State and the Commonwealth. Dawson, which 
was the first Queensland division to be truly in the middle, is the one instance in that 
state of being stressed twice other than in the House enlargement scenarios. The 
difference between the two States continued in 2006. In Queensland only Maranoa (76.3 
per cent) came close to falling below the line. In New South Wales the area as a whole 
(66.8 per cent) was below it, two interacting divisions, Calare (55.0 per cent) and 
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Macquarie (54.4 per cent), were well below, whilst the main subject of controversy, 
Parkes (52.6 per cent), was worse still. 
 
It can also be asked how often significant transfers across the big divisions area border 
have to be made for these ought to be, by definition if the big divisions are inherently 
different, potentially more stressful. Looking at the outcomes of final reports (as shown 
in the Appendix tables), New South Wales recorded 26 internal and 10 cross-border 
substantial transactions, Queensland only 11 and 6 respectively. Not surprisingly, 18 out 
of the total of grand total of 53 are accounted for by the enlargement redistributions of 
1948 and 1984, and another 5 by the failed redistribution of 1975 when a 10 per cent 
deviation from quota was first imposed. When the bag has been shaken that vigorously, 
the area boundary is more likely to be ignored. A focus on each State separately adds a 
couple of possibilities. Apart from the twin redistributions of 1931 and 1934, first lapsed 
and then achieved, and the vigorous shake-ups just mentioned, significant transfers are 
for New South Wales a recent phenomenon  and every redistribution since 1984 has had 
one. But for Queensland, apart from the shake-ups, they were an early phenomenon, 
confined to the first three redistributions as Bundaberg and district were tossed back and 
forth between Capricornia and Wide Bay. Not until 2006, and in the same general area 
though not involving the city of Bundaberg itself this time, was a substantial transfer 
made across the area border once more. 
 
That is not to say that the residents of one State may be become habituated to drastic 
changes to one or more of their divisions, while another will be affrighted by an 
unexpected rare phenomenon. It appears from what has been said or written, within the 
redistribution process itself and in the media and the parliaments concerned, that concern 
often focuses on a single case, the injury apparently done to the electors of one division 
by alleged neglect of one or, less often, a couple of the qualitative criteria. Attention to 
supposed misuse of, or alternatively the malign influence of, the quantitative criterion is 
ordinarily confined to the really professional players, the parliamentarians and a few of 
their party activists, who know of its existence and its statute-guaranteed ability to trump 
any one qualitative criterion, or the array of them if necessary. The intermediaries 
between the professionals and the electors, the journalists of the various media, almost 
invariably take each redistribution as a thing in itself and treat the outcome for any one 
division as quite separate from all the other happenings of the redistribution. The recent 
hubbub about Farrer and Flynn was no more than the latest chapter in a story that has 
been repeating itself for the past hundred years but is too often written up as if it were 
brand new. 
 
 
Is there anything to be done? 
The simplest answer to that question, one that would dispose of the problem completely, 
is to change the electoral system. If members of the House of Representatives were 
elected by some form of proportional representation, as are the members of the Senate, 
there would be no need for internal boundaries within each State or Territory. A variation 
on that reply could be that if local government authorities were sufficiently consolidated 
and their boundaries made difficult to alter, the number of members returned by each 
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could be determined by a population (or enrolment) formula  as is done now for the 
States  and there would be no need to draw internal boundaries just for parliamentary 
elections, provided again that some system of proportional representation were adopted. 
Weighing current dissatisfaction with redistribution procedures against the enduring 
hostility to proportional representation in the major parties, there can be little point in 
pursuing that line of thought, and we should turn instead to considering whether 
something needs to be done to the boundary-drawing process and, if so, what. 
 
We can start with the Commonwealth Constitution: what is now in it, should something 
be taken out, should something(s) be put in? Two existing provisions have been 
mentioned earlier. There is a prohibition, A division shall not be formed out of parts of 
different States, (s.29), and an exhortation The number of members chosen in the 
several States shall be in proportion to the respective numbers of their people (s.24) 
which, as interpreted by the High Court and applied in legislation by successive 
governments, has increased the frequency of redistributions and effectively ensured that 
they will take place. Being able to create a division that straddled one (or more) State 
boundaries has no obvious attractions, now that the two most plausible components of 
such a division, Broken Hill and Mt Isa, are both so diminished in the number of their 
electors. 
 
There is no need to tamper with s.24, but an amendment to the Commonwealth 
Constitution that would operate rather like the Commonwealth Electoral Legislation 
Amendment Act 1983, s.25ZCs (now CEA s.76) scheme for a mini-redistribution might 
be considered. If a seat were gained by a State or Territory the existing largest division 
would be split into two, or if a seat were lost the two smallest contiguous divisions in the 
State or Territory would be merged; this safety-belt would operate for say three elections 
after each general redistribution. It might achieve the purpose Murphy, J. once thought 
the criterion of existing electoral boundaries intended, any too frequent or unnecessary 
alteration of which may be disruptive of relations between an electorate and its 
member.125 But the complexity of the idea, not to mention its hearty contempt for the 
principle of equality, would make it an unlikely venture with the electorate, even if a 
government with a majority in both chambers could be persuaded which is implausible its 
own right. It is unlikely that trying the same remedy by an amendment of the CEA would 
survive challenge in the High Court.   
 
As to the possibility of entrenching in the Constitution some valued provision which is at 
risk by being located in the CEA, when the High Court grappled with the matter in 
McGinty’s Case Dawson, J. conceded that it was possible: 
 
It is fallacious reasoning to posit a system of representative government for which 
the Constitution does not provide and to read the requirement of that system into 
the Constitution by implication.  An implication of that kind is drawn from an 
extrinsic source and not from the text of the Constitution.  It imports into the 
Constitution values which the Constitution does not adopt notwithstanding that it 
is capable of accommodating them.  The Constitution does not, for these reasons, 
                                                 
125 Attorney-General (ex rel. McKinlay) v Commonwealth of Australia, at 634. 
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contain by implication the principle expressed in the words one vote, one value, 
but the parliament may, should it consider it desirable to do so, adopt that 
principle in exercising its power to provide for electoral divisions.  Indeed, it has 
done so in accordance with its view of the practicalities in the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918 (Clth) [including s.66 which makes provision for the plus or 
minus 1/10 margin].126 
 
Doug Anthonys suggestion that a 20 per cent variation might be so enshrined was 
mentioned earlier. However the 1988 Fair Elections referendum, which sought to protect 
10 per cent by this means, failed in every State, was carried in only 19 divisions, and 
secured only 37.6 per cent of the national vote.127   Amending the Commonwealth 
Constitution is a very long shot. 
 
Absent a better alternative, amending the CEA itself appears to be where one might 
realistically start. The first question might be who should draw the boundaries. The 
number per State (or Territory) has grown from one to three to four with six at the 
appellate stage, and that seems quite large enough. An unequivocally judicial element has 
been introduced without tainting the judicial, current or past, members with political 
mud-slinging. Having one member, the Electoral Commissioner, serve on all the 
redistribution committees, and all three members of the AEC serve on all the augmented 
commissions, avoids the risk of unwarranted variation in the application of the CEA. A 
suggestion of conversion from non-partisan to bi-partisan membership would quickly be 
met by reference to the American experience which proves the need for further 
machinery to resolve the deadlocks that regularly result in bi-partisan bodies. 
 
The next question comes in two parts  when to start and how long might the process be 
able to continue once it has started. The first half is tied up with the Constitution, as has 
been pointed out already and, apart from some juggling of a month or two in the passage 
of time after the last general election before the process kicks off, appears 
uncontroversial. The 1998 amendment may, it is too early to be certain, solve the 
problem of a State which is growing so rapidly that it is likely to need a redistribution for 
every new parliament. The South Australian House of Assembly is already subject to 
such a regime, but there does not appear to be any interest in adopting it federally.  
 
As to the second half of the question, in those countries which have thought about the 
matter Australia is often commended for the expedition with which it completes a 
redistribution. With the advent of continuous campaigning, it is likely that the major 
parties at least will want the maximum notice if the landscape has been changed. It might 
be that expansion of a political consultants profession and its accumulation of 
redistribution expertise could help. Some years ago the present writer received a 
Christmas card from one such firm in the United States, showing Santa Claus at work 
drawing electoral boundaries on his terminal, and this is probably the way of the future 
for input, at least from the major players.   
 
                                                 
126 McGinty v Western Australia, 186 CLR 140, at 188, emphasis added. 
127 1988 Referendums: Statistics, 1990, Canberra, AGPS. 
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Expedition also affects the question of judicial review, whether it should be encouraged 
or attempts made to prevent the possibility of it happening. Given the alacrity with which 
the courts, including the High Court, can dispose of knotty questions raised in the final 
weeks of campaigns, and the infrequency with which a genuine crisis (as distinct from a 
governments pursuit of advantage) erupts in the parliamentary timetable, there is not 
much to worry about.   
 
Where there may be occasion for reflection, not least because it was a complaint made in 
respect of the 2006 redistribution, comes from the introduction of public hearings. How 
many should there be and how widely should they be spread through disputed territory? 
If the burghers of X are dissatisfied, is it unreasonable to ask them to travel to Y for their 
day in court? This is a problem in symbolic politics, and can best be judged by the 
redistribution authority concerned. It may also be a matter of exposition: the authority 
might be able to disabuse the dissatisfied by explaining the previously unmentioned 
consequences of giving them what they wanted, but this can easily be mistaken for 
dodging their grievance. When the decision was taken in 1983 to require giving reasons, 
one ground put to the JSCER was that particular decisions may have been substantially 
influenced, or sometimes almost entirely determined, by more pressing or substantial 
considerations elsewhere, and this is certainly being done.128 Perhaps the text might be 
more even extensive at the redistribution committee stage, especially about rejected 
alternatives. Perhaps other media forms could be utilised on the AECs website to present 
the arguments more effectively than prosy print. The substance of the thinking that 
shaped the proposals is certainly now in the public domain to an extent that it was not 
prior to 1983. 
 
Political review is another matter. The paper shows how often prior to 1983 proposals 
were rejected, and either the whole project abandoned or the commissioners told to try 
again, and sometimes told a second time. A warning that the depoliticisation of 
redistributions is probably the most [recent change to electoral administration] at risk 
among the 1983 amendments to the CEA has been published elsewhere.129 Whilst the 
special problems of extra-big divisions figured in the arguments that led to defeat or 
abandonment of redistributions prior to 1983, they were by no means the only 
justification offered, and it would be more realistic to say that partisan advantage was the 
principal cause when the redistribution of one State or many failed to secure acceptance. 
To that extent, the question lies outside the scope of this paper. 
 
Finally it might be asked whether the criteria to be applied should be altered. Little 
attention has been paid to the qualitative criteria for some time, and so far as is known no 
amendments have been in circulation or under scrutiny. In contrast the two quantitative 
criteria, the parameters around the quota and around the enrolment equality target, have 
been raised. It is difficult to see that the change from 20 per cent to 10 per cent for the 
                                                 
128 For example, for the area of concern in New South Wales in 2006 Proposed Redistribution of New 
South Wales into Electoral Divisions, n.d., Canberra, AEC, pp.20-21, 25-27 and 2006  Redistribution of 
New South Wales into Electoral Divisions, 2006, Canberra, AEC, pp.8-11. 
129 Colin Hughes and Brian Costar, Limiting Democracy: The Erosion of Electoral Rights in Australia, 
2006, Sydney, University of NSW Press, p.24. 
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first increased, reduced or had any significant effect on levels of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with redistributions before and after the number was changed. The same 
thing could be said, although the time periods on either side of the change are much 
shorter, for 2 per cent or 3.5 per cent halfway through the life of a redistribution, since 
anticipatory action has been provided in the CEA (s.63A(3)).. 
 
The nub of the matter is whether there should be some additional criterion that allows 
some divisions to be treated differently on the quantitative criterion, with area by far the 
strongest candidate for adoption. Experience of the 5000 square kilometer rule was short-
lived, and the change was little taken up by the 1977 cohort of commissioners; to return 
to it would have to be an act of faith and/or blatant partisanship. A much less generous 
figure, 100 000 sq.km., would benefit the divisions discussed in the paper plus a couple 
more from Western Australia, South Australia and the Northern Territory. Although there 
is no equivalent federal experience to back it up, the formula greatly reduced 
redistribution-related disputation in Queensland when it was introduced there for state 
elections. If asked to do so by the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (it 
would be improper for the Minister to do so), it would be relatively easy for the AEC to 
model its effect in two or three scenarios for all the five jurisdictions likely to be 
involved. That is probably the only suggestion for possible change that warrants serious 
attention at the present time, but the opinion that some of the commentators on what 
happened in 2006 could do with a cold shower might be thrown in.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 2 
Outcome of the 1906 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +28.3% -17.1% net+11.3%*  
Divisions unchanged Barrier, Darling 
             slight change Gwydir, Hume, Macquarie, New England, Riverina 
     substantial change Canoblas 
                   abolished Bland 
Significant transfers Bland>Darling 25.1%, Bland>Riverina 31.3%* 
Electors in same division 67.7%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 3 
Outcome of the 1912 redistributions I and III 
 
Across area boundary +63.5% -14.2% net+49.1%*  
Divisions unchanged Barrier, Darling, Hume, New England
             slight change Gwydir, Macquarie, Riverina 
     substantial change Calare 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Nil 
Electors in same division 89.6%**  
* % of a quota 
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 4 
Outcome of the 1912 redistribution II 
 
Across area boundary +27.0% -105.7% net-78.3%*  
Divisions unchanged Barrier, Darling 
             slight change Hume 
     substantial change Canoblas, Gwydir, New England 
                   Abolished Macquarie, Riverina 
Significant transfers Gwydir>New England 37.5%, Macquarie>Nepean 31.9%, 
Macquarie>Robertson 26.8%, New England>Gwydir-Namoi 
29.2%, Riverina>Barrier 32.4%, Riverina>Calare 38.7%* 
Electors in same division 69.7%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
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Table 5 
Outcome of the 1922 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +53.2% -5.8% net+47.4%*  
Divisions unchanged Nil 
             slight change Canoblas, Gwydir, Hume, Macquarie, New England, Riverina 
     substantial change Darling 
                   abolished Barrier 
Significant transfers Darling>Gwydir 29.1%, Barrier>Darling 46.9%* 
Electors in same division 77.9%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 6 
Outcome of the 1931 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +90.3%*  
Divisions unchanged Hume, Riverinal 
             slight change Calare, Darling, New England, Riverina
     substantial change Gwydir, Macquarie 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Robertson>Macquarie 24.8%* 
Electors in same division 87.8%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 7 
Outcome of the 1934 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +67.1%*  
Divisions unchanged Macquarie, Riverina 
             slight change Calare, Darling, Hume, New England
     substantial change Gwydir 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Robertson>New England 26.38%* 
Electors in same division 90.8%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
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Table 8 
Outcome of the 1948 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +29.5% -85.5% net -56.1%*  
Divisions unchanged Nil 
             slight change Nil 
     substantial change Calare, Darling, Gwydir, Hume, Macquarie, New England, 
Riverina 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Darling>Lawson 36.2%, Gwydir>Lawson 38.9%. Hume>Farrer 
65.1%, Macquarie>Mitchell 32.5%, New England>Paterson 
43.9%* 
Electors in same division 65.9%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 9 
Outcome of the 1955 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +67.1%*  
Divisions unchanged Farrer, Hume 
             slight change Calare, Darling, Gwydir, Lawson, Macquarie, New England, 
Riverina 
     substantial change Nil 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Nil 
Electors in same division 96.3%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 10 
Outcome of the 1962 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary -41.9%*  
Divisions unchanged Macquarie, Riverina 
             slight change Darling, Farrer, Hume 
     substantial change Calare, Lawson, New England 
                   abolished Gwydir 
Significant transfers Gwydir>Lawson 41.3%, Gwydir>New England 28.6%, 
Lawson>Calare 29.9%* 
Electors in same division 75.0%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
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Table 11 
Outcome of the 1968 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary -21.1%*  
Divisions unchanged Darling, Farrer, Macquarie, Riverina 
             slight change Gwydir, Hume, New England 
     substantial change Calare 
                   abolished Lawson 
Significant transfers Lawson>Calare 27.5%, Lawson>Gwydir 30.2%* 
Electors in same division 82.4%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 12 
Outcome of the 1975 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +37.4% -22.7% net+14.7%*  
Divisions unchanged Calare, New England 
             slight change Farrer, Gwydir, Hume, Macquarie 
     substantial change Darling 
                   abolished Riverina 
Significant transfers Darling>Gwydir 38.4%, Eden-Monaro>Hume 27.3%, 
Riverina>Darling 65.1%* 
Electors in same division 74.8%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 13 
Outcome of the 1977 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +30.4% -29.0% net+1.4%*  
Divisions unchanged New England 
             slight change Farrer, Gwydir, Hume, Riverina 
     substantial change Calare, Macquarie 
                   abolished Darling 
Significant transfers Darling>Gwydir 24.4%, Darling>Riverina 34.7%, 
Macquarie>Calare 40.9%* 
Electors in same division 72.6%**  
*  % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
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Table 14 
Outcome of the 1984 redistribution (final) 
 
Across area boundary +107.9% -126.1% nwt-18.2%*  
 Divisions unchanged     Nil 
             slight change New England, Riverina 
     substantial change Calare, Farrer. Gwydir, Hume, Macquarie 
                   abolished                 Nil 
Significant transfers Calare>Parkes 25.3%, Farrer>Hume 43.0%, Gwydir>Parkes 
56.1%, Macquarie>Lindsay 95.5, Paterson>Gwydir 49.4%, 
Riverina>Farrer 23.1% * 
Electors in same division            60.5%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 15 
Outcome of the 1992 redistribution (final) 
 
Across area boundary +55.8% -30.6% net+25.2%*  
Divisions unchanged Nil 
             slight change Calare, Farrer, Macquarie, New England 
     substantial change Gwydir, Hume, Parkes 
                   abolished Riverina-Darling 
Significant transfers Gilmore>Hume 53.9%, Hume>Riverina 51.7%, Riverina-
Darling>Parkes 38.4%* 
Electors in same division 76.4%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 16 
Outcome of the 1999 redistribution (final) 
 
Across area boundary +69.3% -4.1% net+65.2%*  
Divisions unchanged Farrer 
             slight change Calare, Gwydir, Macquarie, New England, Parkes, Riverina 
     substantial change Hume 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Macarthur>Hume 47.1%* 
Electors in same division 90.6%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  76
Table 17 
Outcome of the 2006 redistribution (final) 
 
Across area boundary +6.03% -84.1% net-78.3%*  
Divisions unchanged New England 
             slight change Farrer, Hume, Riverina 
     substantial change Calare, Macquarie, Parkes 
                   abolished Gwydir 
Significant transfers Calare>Macquarie 44.4%, Gwydir>Parkes 73.5%, 
Macquarie>Greenway 44.9%, Parkes>Calare 41.9%* 
Electors in same division 90.6%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 18 
Outcome of the 1906 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +25.0%* (approx)  
Divisions unchanged Herbert, Kennedy  
             slight change Capricornia, Maranoa 
     substantial change Nil 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Wide Bay>Capricornia 25.0%*
Electors in same division 94.4%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 19 
Outcome of the 1912 redistribution (majority) 
 
Across area boundary -26.7%*  
Divisions unchanged Kennedy  
             slight change Capricornia, Herbert, Maranoa 
     substantial change Nil 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Capricornia>Wide Bay 26.7%, Maranoa>Capricornia 25.6%* 
Electors in same division 82.4%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
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Table 20 
Outcome of the 1912 redistribution (unanimous) 
 
Across area boundary -26.7%*  
Divisions unchanged Kennedy  
             slight change Herbert, Maranoa 
     substantial change Capricornia 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Capricornia>Wide Bay 26.7% 25.6%*
Electors in same division 79.0%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 21 
Outcome of the 1922 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +42.1%*  
Divisions unchanged Nil  
             slight change Capricornia, Herbert, Kennedy, Maranoa
     substantial change Nil 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Wide Bay>Capricornia 30.9%* 
Electors in same division 93.8%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 22 
Outcome of the 1931 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +25.9% -19.8% net+5.1%*  
Divisions unchanged Nil  
             slight change Capricornia, Kennedy, Maranoa 
     substantial change Herbert 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Herbert>Kennedy +33.7% -10.5% net+23.2%*
Electors in same division 76.1%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
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Table 23 
Outcome of the 1934 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +28.6% -8.0% net+20.5%* 
Divisions unchanged Kennedy, Maranoa 
             slight change Capricornia 
     substantial change Herbert 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Herbert>Kennedy +27.2%*
Electors in same division 90.6%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 24 
Outcome of the 1948 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary -91.8.0%  
Divisions unchanged Nil 
             slight change Nil 
     substantial change Capricornia, Herbert, Kennedy, Maranoa 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Capricornia>Dawson 34.8%, Capricornia>Wide Bay 37.5%, 
Herbert>Dawson 58.1%, Kennedy>Leichhardt 77.4%* 
Electors in same division 53.1%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 25 
Outcome of the 1955 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +8.8% -0.3% net+8.5%*  
Divisions unchanged Herbert, Maranoa 
             slight change Capricornia, Kennedy, Leichhardt
     substantial change Dawson 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Dawsont>Capricornia 29.6%* 
Electors in same division 90.6%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
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Table 26 
Outcome of the 1962 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary -24.1%*  
Divisions unchanged Herbert, Leichhardt, Maranoa
             slight change Kennedy 
     substantial change Capricornia 
                   abolished Dawson 
Significant transfers Dawson>Capricornia 56.1%* 
Electors in same division 84.3%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 27 
Outcome of the 1968 redistribution (majority I) 
 
Across area boundary +15.8%*  
Divisions unchanged Dawson, Maranoa 
             slight change Capricornia, Herbert, Kennedy, Leichhardt
     substantial change Nil 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Nil 
Electors in same division 91.6%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 28 
Outcome of the 1968 redistribution (majority II) 
 
Across area boundary +15.8%*  
Divisions unchanged Maranoa 
             slight change Capricornia, Dawson, Herbert, Kennedy, Leichhardt 
     substantial change Nil 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Nil 
Electors in same division 90.3%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
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Table 29 
Outcome of the 1975 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary -8.1%*  
Divisions unchanged Capricornia, Leichhardt 
             slight change Herbert, Maranoa 
     substantial change Dawson 
                   abolished Kennedy 
Significant transfers Kennedy>Dawson 30.3%, Kennedy>Maranoa/Flynn 32.6%* 
Electors in same division 76.2%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 30 
Outcome of the 1977 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +32.1%*  
Divisions unchanged Dawson, Kennedy, Leichhardt, Maranoa
             slight change Capricornia, Herbert 
     substantial change Nil 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Nil 
Electors in same division 98.9%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 31 
Outcome of the 1984 redistribution (final) 
 
Across area boundary +1.0% -87.3% net-86.3%*  
Divisions unchanged Nil 
             slight change Dawson, Herbert, Leichhardt, Maranoa 
     substantial change Capricornia, Kennedy 
                   Abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Capricornia>Hinkler 45.8%, Dawson>Capricornia 25.4%, 
Leichhart>Kennedy 32.1%* 
Electors in same division 76.2%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
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Table 32 
Outcome of the 1992 redistribution (final) 
 
Across area boundary +19.7% -9.4% net+10.3%*  
Divisions unchanged Dawson 
             slight change Capricornia, Herbert, Kennedy, Leichhardt, Maranoa 
     substantial change Nil 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Nil 
Electors in same division 92.7%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 33 
Outcome of the 1994 redistribution (final) 
 
Across area boundary -4.1%*  
Divisions unchanged Capricornia, Dawson, Kennedy, Leichhardt, Maranoa 
             slight change Herbert 
     substantial change Nil 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Nil 
Electors in same division 99.1%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 34 
Outcome of the 1997 redistribution (final) 
 
Across area boundary -16.4%*  
Divisions unchanged Nil 
           
             slight change 
Capricornia, Dawson, Herbert, Kennedy, Leichhardt, Maranoa 
     substantial change Nil 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Nil 
Electors in same division 92.3%**  
* % of a quota  
** % of area original enrolment 
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Table 35 
Outcome of the 2003 redistribution 
 
Across area boundary +13.1%*  
Divisions unchanged Dawson, Kennedy, Leichhardt 
             slight change Capricornia, Herbert, Maranoa
     substantial change Nil 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Nil 
Electors in same division 96.2%**  
* % of a quota 
** % of area original enrolment 
 
Table 36 
Outcome of the 2006 redistribution (final) 
 
Across area boundary +81.0%*  
Divisions unchanged Nil 
           
             slight change 
Capricornia, Dawson, Herbert, Kennedy, Leichhardt, Maranoa 
     substantial change Nil 
                   abolished Nil 
Significant transfers Hinkler>Flynn 54.7%* 
Electors in same division 92.3%**  
* % of a quota  
  
 
